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THE METHODOLOGY OF THE 
NEO-AUSTRIAN RESEARCH PROGRAMME1 
by Rudy van Zijp 
1. INTRODUCTTON 
Since the 1970s the Austrian school of economics has experienced a modest revival. lts main 
ideas, notably on the dispersion of knowledge and the social-evolutionary theory of institutions, 
have given it (at least on these topics) a possible way back into the spotlights of economics. 
However, there are some aspects of 'Austrianism' which seem to clash with mainstream views. 
In particular, these ideas concern methodological and philosophical (more specifically, epistemo-
logical) issues. 
As White (1984) has shown, differences of opinion with regard to methodology and 
particularly epistemology belong very much to the tradition of the Austrian School. Austrians 
have based their methodological views on very divergent epistemological foundations. Even the 
older Austrians did not agree on this point.2 Nevertheless, despite these differences, one may 
maintain that Austrians adhere to more or less the same methodology. It has been depicted as 
idiosyncratic and mistaken. Some (even famous) historians of economie thought think that the 
apriorism on which it is based, is "... a throwback to the Neanderthal 'essentialism' of yesterday" 
(Blaug (1980b, p. 273)). More recently, other philosophers and methodologists have relaxed this 
harsh judgment. The main purpose of this survey will be to give an account of Neo-Austrian 
methodology. However, as this methodology is rather different from 'mainstream' empiricism (in 
a broad sense), it is necessary to elaborate on its epistemological underpinnings. 
The analysis is restricted in several ways. Firstly, we shall not consider the views of the 
'older Austrians'. The analysis is limited to what may be called the Neo-Austrian school. The 
analysis starts with the views of Ludwig von Mises, who is considered to be the 'bridge' between 
the older generation, including Menger, Wieser and Böhm-Bawerk, and the younger one, 
including economists such as Hayek, Lachmann, Kirzner4 and Rothbard. He has influenced many 
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 Unfortunately, Kirzner has not made clear his views on the logical foundations of the 
action axiom. As Caldwell (1984, p. 363) observes, "... Israël Kirzner approaches methodological 
questions rather pragmatically." This assessment is based on conversations between Kirzner and 
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economists, including Neo-Austrians as well as Neoclassicals.5 Mises's emigration to the U.SA., 
forced by the threat posed by Hitler Germany, has proven to play an important part in the 
dissemination of Austrian ideas. In the 1970s Anglo-American Neo-Austrians have revived 
interest in 'Austrianism' in general and Mises in particular. They regard his magnum opus 
Human Action as the fundamental work in which he ouüined the Neo-Austrian research 
programme (although they do not adopt this Lakatosian concept). 
The second restriction which is adopted concerns the Austrian philosophy of science. 
The different epistemologies will lead to different demarcation and classification criteria. The 
analysis presented in this paper will be restricted to what may be called pure theory. Menger 
(1883 (1969), pp. 8 - 9 ) already distinguished three types of economics as a social science, 
namely (1) theory, (2) history, and (3) 'the art of economie policy\ This tripartition was fairly 
common during the nineteenth century. For instance, Senior also foliowed this tripartition. And 
Mises also adopted this practice by distinguishing between praxeology, history and policy. Other 
Neo-Austrians have foliowed Mises in this regard, although they sometimes used different terms. 
Hayek (1933a) also distinguished between theory and application (including statistics and 
policy). In this paper we shall restrict our attention to (pure) economie theory. 
This paper aims at a formulation of the Austrian views on methodology in terms of 
Lakatos's framework, the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes (MSRP). However, such 
representation offers some difficulties. Lakatos's methodology stands in the critical-rationalist 
tradition, claiming that universal knowledge is a priori, but need not be a priori valid. This 
position is inconsistent with one type of Austrian apriorism which holds that universal knowled-
Caldwell at New York University in 1981 - 82 (Caldwell (1984, p. 363 note 1). 
5
 Among the Austrian economists who can be considered Neoclassical are Gottfried 
Haberler and Fritz Machlup. Furthermore, the Austrian influence on Neoclassicism may also 
become clear by Robbins's reference to Mises in his influential Essay on the Nature and 
Significance of Economie Science (1932). 
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 Mises (1949 (1966), p. 30) argues that "[t]here are two main branches of the sciences of 
human action: praxeology and history." He continues by defining these types as follows: "History 
is the collection and systematic arrangement of all the data of experience concerning human 
action. It deals with the concrete content of human action. It studies all human endeavors in 
their infinite multiplicity and variety and all human actions with all their accidental, special, and 
particular implications." By contrast, "[p]raxeology is a theoretical and systematic, not a historical 
science. lts scope is human action as such, irrespective of all environmental, accidental, and 
individual circumstances of the concrete acts. ... It aims at knowledge valid for all instances in 
which the conditions exactly correspond to those implied in its assumptions and inferences. lts 
statements and propositions are not derived from experience. They are, like those of logic and 
mathematics, a priori." The third branche of the tripartition is 'policy'. It is also an application 
of praxeology. According to Mises (1933 (1960), p. 40), liberalism is a social technology. 
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 At this stage it is important to notice that Hayek does not adopt the Misesian term 
'praxeology'. As wül be argued below, following Huussen (1990), Hayek does not adhere to the 
Misesian philosophy of science. In particular, he maintains that the action axiom is not a 
synthetic a priori proposition. 
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ge is also a priori valid. The respective positions may best be explicated in tenns of an 
epistemological taxonomy, formulated by Kant (cf. section 22.). As the epistemological views of 
the MSRP and Austrian apriorism are mutually inconsistent, it seems that the use of the MSRP 
for describing Austrian apriorism is in need of some justification. This justification is given in 
section 4. Lakatos's MSRP will turn out to be applicable if its aims and uses are restricted. 
The paper is organized as follows. Firstly, it will give an exposition of Neo-Austrian 
apriorism by studying the epistemological underpinnings of the action axiom. It will also contain 
a brief description of Kant's epistemological taxonomy. Next, in section 3, we shall discuss Neo-
Austrian methodology, discerning two currents. Section 4 gives the justification for using 
Lakatos's MSRP in order to describe Neo-Austrian methodology, and section 5 contains this 
description. Finally, section 6 contains some conclusions and final remarks. 
2. (NEO-)AUSTRIAN APRIORISM 
The existence and/or possibility of universal, a priori valid propositions need not have implicati-
ons for economics as a science. For this to be the case some of the fundamental propositions in 
economics must be of this type. Neo-Austrians claim that such a connection exists. They 
consider individuals as rational beings, who try to achieve an end by the use of as little as 
possible means. This fundamental postulate is called the rationality postulate or the action 
axiom? It provides the foundation for Neo-Austrian analysis. It is this postulate which some 
Neo-Austrians consider universal and a priori valid. 
Before analyzing Neo-Austrian methodology, the question of the truth status of the 
postulate must now be adressed. As will be shown, this truth status will have some important 
consequences, for instance as regards the role of empirical testing. Therefore, we shall discuss it 
rather extensively. But first we must make dear what we mean by claiming that all human 
beings act rationally. 
2.1. THE CONCEPT OF HUMAN ACTION 
like most schools of economie thought the Austrian school starts from the assumption that 
individuals are rational. Austrians make a distinction between action and mere behaviour. Not all 
human behaviour may be called action. Action, according to Mises, implies those situations in 
which man is able to change bis circumstances. Whenever man influences his future situation he 
The rationality postulate can be interpreted as either a technical or an economie principle. 
The latter holds that economie agents select their goals from opportunities and try to reach 
these goals at the lowest costs. The former already assumes that the goals are chosen. They are 
then given. Agents merely must select the means which will fulfill the goals at the lowest costs. I 
owe this distinction to Dr. Bert Huussen, Free University Amsterdam. 
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acts. Action takes place wherever the conditions for human interference are present, that is, 
wherever man can choose. As Mises (1949 (1966), p. 13) puts it: "He who endures what he 
could change acts no less than he who interferes in order to attain another result. ... Action is 
not only doing but no less omitting to do what possibly could be done." 
Man acts as soon as he is in a situation in which he can choose. Therefore, action 
implies choice. This means that man is the cause of his own actions: he is free to decide on his 
own actions. Moreover, the action axiom has some other important implications. FirsÜy, action 
can be termed 'purposeful' because the actor wants to achieve a goal. That is, he wants to 
change his expected future set of circumstances into a more favourable one. Action is thus based 
on 'uneasiness' (Mises (1949 (1966), p. 13)).9 In addition, it also implies time, as the action is 
directed towards a future set of circumstances. Secondly, uneasiness is not a sufficiënt reason for 
the existence of action. Man must also have an image of a more satisfactory state of affairs. His 
action is directed towards a goal; therefore, human action is a teleologjcal concept. Thirdly, the 
actor must expect to attain the future set of circumstances which is regarded as more favoura-
ble, by acting. The action is seen as sufficiënt to reach the goal. It serves as a means in the 
sense that once employed the actor expects it to lead to the goal. This means that the concept 
of action also implies causality. The individual actor must presuppose a clear ends - means 
relationship in order to determine the appropriate action. In other words, he must have a 
theory. However, it should be noted that this theory need not be correct, as the actor may be 
disappointed. Mises (1949 (1966), p. 14) calls 'uneasiness', 'goal-directed', and 'the expectations 
to reach the goal by acting' "the general conditions of human action." In his view, the existence 
of action implies all three conditions. 
The question concerning the truth status of the rationality postulate now arises. On 
this issue Neo-Austrians differ. Three positions may be distinguished, which may most clearly be 
expressed in terms of Kant's taxonomy of types of propositions (although one position in fact is 
incompatible with Kantian epistemology). 
2.2. TYPES OF PROPOSITIONS 
Before describing the various logical underpinnings of the action axiom it will prove useful to 
introducé a (not very new) taxonomy. It refers to the nature of knowledge (propositions), and 
was formulated by Immanuel Kant. Of course, this is not to say that it can deal with all logical 
underpinnings. More in particular, (Aristotelian) essentialistic propositions fall outside its realm. 
Nevertheless, it is useful in the sense that it makes clear in what ways Neo-Austrian epistemolo-
gy differs from those of logical positivism (and its successors). However, some Neo-Austrians 
interpret the action axiom as an essentialistic propositions, as we shall see. Therefore, the 
'Uneasiness' is a necessary precondition for action. It does not cause action, because the 
actor is free to decide how and when to act. 
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Kantian taxonomy must be supplemented by this latter type of propositions. 
22.1. KANTS TAXONOMY 
Kant distinguished four basic types of propositions. According to this taxonomy, propositions are 
either a priori or a posteriori, and either anafytic or synthetic. A priori knowledge is not derived 
from experience; it arises with experience. By contrast, a posteriori arises out of experience 
(Copleston (1964, p. 217). A priori knowledge may be either analytic or synthetic. Analytic 
propositions can shown to be true in all logkaüy possible cases. Their logical structure is 
tautological: their negation would result in a contradiction. As Copleston (1964, p. 219, italics in 
original) states, "[ajnalytic judgments are those in which the predicate is contained, at least 
implicitly, in the concept of the judgment. They are said to be 'explicative judgments' (Erlaute-
mngsurteilé) because the predicate does not add to the concept of the subject anything which is 
not already contained in it, explicitly or implicitly. And their truth depends upon the law of 
contradiction." The explicative nature of analytic judgments implies that it is not certain whether 
they say something about 'reality'; in this sense analytic propositions are cognitively important 
though empirically meaningless. Experience cannot provide insights into analytical propositions. 
The law of contradiction suffices to establish their truth. In this sense they are always a priori 
valid. 
By contrast, synthetic propositions have a logically contingent structure. Their negation 
does not result into a contradiction. Their truth can (in principle) only be established by 
empirical testing. Or, again according to Copleston (1964, p. 219, italics in original), "[s]ynthetic 
judgments, however, affirm or deny of a subject a predicate which is not contained in the 
concept of the subject. They are called, therefore, 'ampliative' or 'augmentative judgments' 
(Erweiterungsurteiïé), because they add something to the concept of the subject." As we have 
seen, analytic judgments are always a priori statements. According to Kant, synthetic judgments 
are either a priori or a posteriori propositions. As Copleston (1964, p. 219 - 20, italics in 
original) explains, "[i]n all synthetic judgments ... something is added to the concept of the 
subject. A connection is affirmed (to restrict our attention to the affirmative judgment) between 
predicate and subject, but the predicate cannot be got out of the subject, so to speak, by mere 
analysis. Now, this connection may be purely factual and contingent: it is then given only in and 
through experience. And when this is the case, the judgment is synthetic a posteriori." However, 
if the connection cannot be derived by mere analysis, while at the same time being necessary 
I
 Kant (1787, pp. 3 - 4 , italics in original) stated that "[w]ir werden ... im Verfolg unter 
Erkenntnissen a priori nicht solche verstellen, die von dieser oder jener, sondern die schlechter-
dings von aller Erfahrung unabhangig stattfinden." A posteriori knowledge is formed by "... 
empirische Erkenntnisse, oder solche, die nur a posteriori, d.i. durch Erfahrung, möglich sind ..." 
I I
 "Denn, ehe ich zur Erfahrung gehe, habe ich alle Bedingungen zu meinem Urteile schon 
in dem Begriffe, aus welchem ich das Pradikat nach dem Satze des Widerspruchs nur herauszie-
hen, und dadurch gleich der Notwendigkeit des Urteils bewust werden kann, welche mir 
Erfahrung nicht einmal lehren würde" (Kant (1787, p. 12)). 
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and universal, the proposition under consideration is called a synthetic a priori proposition.12 
Erapiricists acknowledge the existence of synthetic a posteriori propositions and analytic a priori 
propositions (cf. Caldwell (1982, pp. 121 - 22)). However, they do not acknowledge the existence 
of synthetic a priori propositions. It is in this respect that the Austrian aprioristic views differ 
from 'mainstream' empiricism. Therefore, the question conceming the existence of this type of 
proposition must now be addressed. 
222. HOW ARE SYNTHETIC A PRIORI PROPOSITIONS POSSIBLE? 
Kant argued that the human mind is not passive in knowledge. The activity of the mind, 
however, does not mean that it creates knowledge out of nothing. It merely means that the mind 
imposes its own forms of cognition on the sense-impressions. These impressions can only be 
known if moulded in terms of particular concepts, such as time and space.13 These concepts are 
a priori in the sense that they do not arise out of experience but rather with it; they are called 
categories. The categories synthesize the manifold of the phenomena (Copleston (1964, p. 249)), 
and can be found in the faculty of judgment.14 They must be viewed as the necessary conditions 
for objects to be thought. And Kant's transcendental philosophy aims at identifying these 
Kant (1787, p. 13) gives an example. Consider the proposition 'Everything which happens 
has its cause'. The predicate ('having a cause') is obviously not contained in the concept of the 
subject ('everything which happens'). Therefore, the proposition is synthetic. Moreover, the 
connection between subject and predicate is given a priori. The proposition tells us something 
about the way we look at reality. Either you uphold it or you reject it, but there is no use in 
testing it (confronting it with experience). Neither is it a mere generalization of past experience, 
reached by induction. It is a precondition to look scientifically (i.e., to explain causally). In this 
view, we know a priori that everything which happens must have a cause. Therefore, the 
statement, says Kant, is a synthetic a priori proposition. 
All perceptions of objects external to us (external sense-experience) must be represented 
in space, while all objects interaal to us (interaal sense-perceptions, e.g., thoughts) are represen-
ted in time. Copleston (1964, p. 239 note 5) points out that Hume had already remarked that 
we cannot properly speak of one internal state as being to the left or to the right of another. 
But we can, and must, perceive internal states as either following one another or as being 
simultaneous. 
14
 Kant (1787, pp. 9 3 - 9 4 ) claims that judgments necessarily must presuppose a concept 
which applies to all impressions to be judged. There must be some common denominator, 
otherwise the impressions would not be comparable. Therefore, judgments presuppose the unity 
of our impressions; they synthesize them by classifying them under a unifying concept. He 
continues by claiming that all activities of reason can be converted into judgments. In this sense 
thinking coincides with judging. To put it in Kant's own words: "[i]n jedem Urteil ist ein Begriff, 
der für viele gilt, und unter diesem Vielen auch eine gegebene Vorstellung begreift, welche 
letztere denn auf den Gegenstand unmittelbar bezogen wird. ... Alle Urteile sind demnach 
Funktionen der Einheit unter unsern Vorstellungen, da namlich statt einer unmittelbaren 
Vorstellung eine höhere, die diese und mehrere unter sich begreift, zur Erkenntnis des 
Gegenstandes gebraucht, und viele mögliche Erkenntnisse dadurch in einer zusammengezogen 
werden. Wir können aber alle Handlungen des Verstandes auf Urteile zurückfïïhren, so da£ der 
Verstand überhaupt als ein Vermogen zu urteilen vorgestellt werden kann. Denn er ist nach 
dem obigen ein Vermogen zu denken." Kant (1787, p. 95) gives the scheme showing which 
category corresponds to which logica! function. 
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conditions. It holds that we cannot know the things-in-themselves ('das Ding an sich', the 
noumena) but merely their representations in tenns of our categories (the phenomena). As the 
categories are supposed to be present in all human minds, they are 'objective' in the sense that 
they do not depend on the subject possessing them.15 Man cannot think and know otherwise 
than in terms of the categories. Thus, all (analytic and synthetic) knowledge must be structured 
in terms of the categories. Knowledge concerning the categories is then both a priori and 
synthetic. After all, as we cannot observe otherwise than in terms of the categories, they teil us 
something about the world as we are able to observe it. In this sense knowledge a priori indeed 
tells us something about reality (although 'reality' must here be interpreted as phenomenal 
reality, that is, 'reality as we may know it'). However, there is no guarantee that the categories 
may unveil 'reality as it is' (noumenal reality). As Huussen (1989, p. 126) stated, "[t]hus Kant 
pronounced a veto over essentialism." 
In sum, the categories and their logica! implications provide knowledge a priori which 
at the same time tells us something about the phenomenal world. This means that the categories 
provide us with synthetic knowledge a priori. This knowledge is universally valid as well as 
potentially empirically meaningful.16 
Given the supposed enstence of synthetic a priori propositions, we must now look at 
its implications for economics as a science. 
2.3. HUMAN ACTION AS A SYNTHETIC A PRIORI PROPOSITION 
Mises seems to adhere to the position that 'human action' is a Kantian category, and therefore a 
synthetic a priori proposition. He build bis praxeology, i.e., the science of human action, on this 
proposition, thereby rendering all its logically valid derivations universally true and (potentially) 
empirically meaningful. This means that he rejected the logical positivists' position that 
knowledge a priori is always analytical (i.e. tautological though cognitively significant). As Bruce 
Kant (1783 (1979), section 18) argues that "[ëfynpirische Urteile, sofem sie objektive 
Gültigkeit haben, sind Erfahrungsurteile; die aber, so nur subjektiv guitig sind, nenne ich blo/? 
Wahrnehmungsurteile. Die letzteren bedürfen keines reinen Verstandesbegriffs, sondern nur der 
logischen Verknüpfung der Wahrnehmung in einem denkenden Subjekt. Die ersteren aber 
erfordern jederzeit über die Vorstellungen der simüichen Anschauung noch besondere, im 
Verstande ursprünglich erzeugte Begriffe, welche es eben machen, da/9 das Erfahrungsurteil objektiv 
guitig ist." Kant (1783 (1979), section 19) continues by stating that "[d]as Objekt bleibt an sich 
selbst immer unbekannt; wenn aber durch den Verstandesbegriff die Verknüpfung der Vorstel-
lungen, die unsrer Sinnlichkeit [Le., sensibility, the receptivity of the mind for sense-impressions] 
von ihm gegeben sind, als allgemeingültig bestimmt wird, so wird der Gegenstand durch dieses 
Verhaltnis bestimmt, und das Urteil ist objektiv. ... Was die Erfahrung unter gewissen Umstan-
den mich lehrt, mxxB sie mich jederzeit und auch jedermann lehren, und die Gültigheit derselben 
schrankt sich nicht auf das Subjekt oder seinen damaligen Zustand ein. Daher spreche ich alle 
dergleichen Urteile als objektiv guitige aus ..." 
16
 Synthetic knowledge is potentially empirically meaningful because it refers to potential 
experience. 
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Caldweü (1982, pp. 121 - 22) states, "[a]ccording to the analytic-synthetic distinction a priori 
statements are considered cognitively significant but empirically empty. Mises rejects this 
approach, which he correctly attributes to the iogical positivists, and takes a Kantian perspective 
in arguing that the axioms of praxeology, because they involve necessary categories of the mind, 
are both a priori true yet [potentially] empiricaUy meaningful."17 Mises (1962 (1978), p. 2) makes 
dear that he does not agree with the epistemological views of the Iogical positivists18. He states 
that traditional epistemology has disregarded the most fundamental category, namely, that of 
action: "[t]he main deficiency of traditional epistemological attempts is to be seen in their neglect 
of the praxeological aspect. ... They ignored the praxeological a priori.Hl9 In his opinion, "[a]ll the 
elements of the theoretical sdences of human action are already implied in the category of 
action and have to be made explidt by expanding its contents. As among these elements of 
teleology is also the category of causality, the category of action is the fundamental category of 
epistemology, the starting point of any epistemological analysis" (Mises (1962 (1978), p. 8)).20 
There has been some critidsm of the use Mises made of the concept of the 'synthetic 
a priori'. According to Martin (1964, p. 129), Kant's synthetic a priori proposition is a proposi-
tion about the nature of concepts as space, time, etc. About these we have a priori knowledge in 
the sense that no empirical knowledge, or even orderly experience, is possible without them. 
This knowledge is also 'synthetic' because it can be revealed only through experience, i.e., 
through specific instances of the categories. Martin critidzes Mises because she thinks that 
although the proposition of human action is an a priori proposition, it is not a synthetic one. 
She thinks that the proposition concerning the purposiveness of human action is analytic, 
because in her view the proposition is merely true by definition. 
A second objection, which also seems to underlie Martin's critiósm, has been raised by 
For a dear exposition on the differences and relations between the analytic-synthetic and 
the a priori - a posteriori distinctions, cf. Bernardelli (1936). 
1
 The terms 'Iogical positivists' and 'Iogical empiridsts' will be used as synonyms through-
out this paper. 
Mises's ideas on philosophy and methodology are often referred to as 'praxeological'. 
It may be argued that Misesian apriorism resembles Aristotelian essentialism. For 
instance, consider his remarks on the reality of the world in Mises (1962 (1978), p. 6). He 
argues that the noumenal world can be known by stating that "[fjor thousands of years the 
minds of physidans did not perceive germs and did not divine their existence. But the success or 
failure of their endeavors to prserve their patients' health and lives depended on the way germs 
influenced or did not influence the functioning of the patients' bodily organs. The germs were 
real because they conditioned the outcome of events either by interfering or by not interfering, 
either by being present in or by being absent from the field." This explanation already presuppo-
ses the truth of the theory that particular diseases are caused by the presence of germs. 
However, it seems rather questionable whether this truth can be established. The causal 
relationship between the presence of the germ and the occurrence of the disease seems to be 
best described as conjectural, and therefore contingent, in nature. 
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Popper (1963 (1989), p. 48). He argues that propositions in general are conjectures directed 
towards solving a problem. In nis view Kant had been right when claiming that nature does not 
impose its laws upon us, but we impose them upon nature. However, Kant concluded that these 
laws are necessarily true. Popper holds that the laws may be false. Therefore, the laws are 
conjectures which means that they are not necessarily a priori valid. In Popper's view, Kant 
returns to a kind of essentialism when he speaks about the categorical structure of the human 
mind (Popper and Ecdes (1977, p. 172)). As Huussen (1989, p. 126) explains, "... knowledge 
which arises in the explication of categorical structures is knowledge of the essence of the 
mental world, if it be assumed that we can grasp these structures intuitively." Mises (1962 
(1978), pp. 42, 70, 120) concurs with Popper in the case of the natural sciences. However, with 
regard to praxeology, he does not even consider Popper's criticism when stating that "[l]ike logic 
and mathematics, praxeological knowledge is within us; it does not come from without" (Mises 
(1949 (1966), p. 64)). Knowledge concerning the physical external world does come from 
without. Therefore, the source of knowledge regarding the external world differs from the source 
of knowledge concerning the world within us. Mises thus discerns two worlds, one of which may 
be known from without, while the other may be known from within. As there is a difference in 
sources from which knowledge is derived, Mises concludes, there may be a difference in the 
logical status of propositions derived from both sources. 
2.4. HUMAN ACTION AS A SELF-EVIDENT, A POSTERIORI 
PROPOSITION 
The idea of praxeology yielding objective23, universally valid, and yet empirically meaningful 
knowledge is very much questioned by non-Austrians. This leads some Neo-Austrians to provide 
the action axiom with different epistemological foundations. Selgin (1988, p. 21), for instance, 
1
 Huussen (1989, p. 127) thinks that Mises did not use the rationality principle as a 
principle of explanation, as Popper did, but rather as a principle of dassification. He explains 
this by arguing that "... Popper ties in with Kant's theoretical philosophy, which is dedicated to 
the problems of our knowledge regarding the physical universe - mathematics, physics and 
metaphysics. Mises links up with Kant's practical or moral philosophy, which is concerned with 
our knowledge of human action" (p. 125). 
22
 Huussen (1989, pp. 126 - 8)) explains this difference between Popper and Mises as 
arising because of the fact that the former interprets human action theoretically, while the latter 
uses it practically. This means that Popper tries to explain human action, whereas Mises uses the 
proposition as a means of dassification. It enables hun to distinguish between human action and 
human behaviour. The former may be explained in terms of cause and effect, but the latter 
cannot. In Mises's view, human action is 'caused' by a free agent, who did something which 
might have left undone. The freedom of man leads to action, not to behaviour. In this sense, 
behaviour can be explained deterministically, whereas action cannot. 
23
 By objective knowledge I mean Kant's notion of objective knowledge, namely knowledge 
which is independent of the subject possessing that knowledge. 
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argues that praxeology deduces inviolable laws from the "... allegedly incontestable truth that 
people act purposefully, the 'axiom of action'. Although supposedly irrefutable, this axiom is not 
merely 'analytic', i.e., nonempirical or vacuous. It is based on the reality of the pursuit of ends 
and the choice of means for their attainment that distinguishes all mental (and, hence, human) 
activity. Thus a priori to Mises means 'independence of any particular time and place'. It does 
not imply independence from all 'experience', although it does denote independence from the 
sort of sensory experience that empiricism and historicism emphasize: 'It rests on universal inner 
experience, and not simply on external experience, i.e., its evidence is reflective rather than 
physical'." Unfortunately, it is not made clear why our reflections should be true for other 
individuals, that is, why other individuals should act and think like we do. 
Rothbard (1976, p. 24) also defends the truth status of the action axiom. He refers to 
two types of experience, namely inner experience and external experience (or sense impressions). 
He argues that the axiom is not an a priori proposition in the Kantian sense. In his view, 
"Ludwig von Mises, as an adherent of Kantian epistemology, asserted that the axiom of action is 
a priori to all experience, because it is, like the law of cause and effect, part of 'the essential 
and necessary character of the logical stnicture of the human mind'. ... I would deny, as an 
Aristotelian and neo-Thomist, any such alleged 'laws of logical stnicture' that the human mind 
necessarily imposes on the chaoüc stnicture of reality. Instead, I would call all such laws 'laws of 
reality'... My view is that the fundamental axiom and subsidiary axioms are derived from the 
experience of reality and are therefore in the broadest sense empirical..." The question arises 
what Rothbard means by the 'laws of reality* ? If he cannot be called an apriorist in the 
Kantian sense, what is his opinion of the epistemological status of the action axiom ? How can 
we know that this axiom is universally valid and empirically meaningful ? The answers to these 
questions become clear when Rothbard (1976, p. 25) states that, "... (1) they [i.e., the fundamen-
tal axiom and subsidiary axioms] are so broadly based in common human experience that once 
enunciated they become self-evident and hence do not meet the fashionable criterion of 
'falsifiability'; (2) they rest, particularly the action axiom, on universal inner experience, as well 
as on external experience, that is, the evidence is reflective rather than purely physical; and (3) 
they are therefore a priori to the complex historica! events to which modern empiricism confines 
the concept of 'experience'." According to Rothbard, the fundamental category (or in his terms 
'axiom') of human action is neither a synthetic nor an analytic a priori proposition. The action 
axiom is derived by the method of 'introspection' or 'Verstehen', as well as by our external 
experience that other people also act purposefully. But then the question arises how we can 
know for certain that other people also act in this way? Given the absence of an inductive logic, 
how can we infer general, universally valid statements with 'apodictic certainty' from our 
experience? In order to answer this 'Humean' question Rothbard quotes Harmon Chapman 
(1953, p. 29), who argued that "... conception is a kind of awareness, a way of apprehending 
things - or comprehending them - and not an alleged subjective manipulation of so-called 
generalities or universals solely 'mental' or 'logical' in their provenience and non-cognitive in 
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nature. ... perception and experience are not the results or end products of a synthetic process a 
priori, but are themselves synthetic or comprehensive apprehensions whose structured unity is 
prescribed solely by the nature of the real, ... and not by consciousness itself whose (cognitive) 
nature is to apprehend the real - as it is." By concurring with Chapman, Rothbard seems to 
adhere to a kind of 'essentialistic (or Aristotelian) epistemology*. He claims that the human 
mind is capable of understanding the real, and even more stringently, the real as it is (the 
noumenal world). The nature of the real prescribes the structural unity of perception and experience. 
In this sense reality determines the content of human knowledge, or in other words, there is a 
one-to-one-correspondence between the 'real' world and our images of that world: the noumenal 
and the phenomenal world coincide. Man knows reality as it is. 
In conclusion, Rothbard rejects the analytic-synthetic distinction. This rejection is based 
on a rather different epistemology from Mises's. Rothbard provides an Aristotelian foundation 
for the action axiom. However, this foundation still leads to the conclusion that praxeology can, 
and witt, lead to universally valid and empirically meaningful knowledge. Rothbard (1957, p. 318) 
calls this knowledge 'a priori' because it is "a priori to the complex historical events" to which 
modern empiricism confines the concept of 'experience'. However, we must conclude that 
Rothbard uses a different concept of 'a priori knowledge' than Kant and Mises, following from 
his Aristotelian and neo-Thomistic view on knowledge. In Kantian terms, Rothbard's concept of 
an 'a priori proposition' may better be labelled a 'self-evident, a posteriori proposition'. 
Nevertheless, Mises and Rothbard both argue that the action axiom is 'true', that is, universally 
valid and empirically meaningful. Therefore, they can be considered as proponents of what may 
be called dog/natie 'Austrianism'. 
2.5. HUMAN ACTION AS AN ANALYTIC PROPOSITION 
2 5.1. HAYEK 
Hutchison (1981, p. 215), in discussing Hayek's views on the logical foundation of the action 
axiom, claims that Hayek's thought must be divided into two phases, namely Hayek I (until 
1936) and Hayek II (from 1937 onwards). The ideas of Hayek I are said to show affinities with 
those of Mises, while Hayek II is said to be highly influenced by Popper. This change in 
Hayek's thought, the so-called 'U-turn', is supposed to have taken place in the late 1930s, more 
precisely in 1937, when Hayek published his paper 'Economics and Knowledge'. In his post-
1937-writings, Hutchison argues, Hayek even accepts Popper's demarcation criterion. This 
criterion, however, is incompatible with the a priori certainties of Ludwig von Mises. Hayek II 
seems to regard economics as an empirical instead of an o priori science. Hutchison (1981, p. 
215) interprets this supposed incompatibility by arguing that there was a fundamental shift in 
Hayek's methodological ideas. Butler and Barry agree with Hutchison's observations, even if the 
latter (1979, p. 40) explains Hayek's volte-face somewhat differently: "[t]he difficulty, I think, lies 
in Hayek's attempt to combine two rather different philosophies of social science; the Neo-
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Austrian praxeological school with its subjectivism and rejection of testability in favour of 
axiomatic reasoning, and the hypothetico-deductive approach of contemporary science with its 
emphasis on falsifiability and empirical content. This was not really a problem for Mises since 
he did not endorse the Popperian approach but it is something of a problem for Hayek." 
Recently this interpretation of Hayekian methodology has been criticized by Caldwell 
(1988) and Huussen (1990). Huussen (1990) takes the more philosophical route. He argues that 
Hayek did not adhere to Misesian apriorism but, instead, was highly influenced by Ernst Mach. 
He shows that Hayek (1929, p. 7, note 1) already stressed that economics is a science aiming at 
predictions. Furfhermore, Hayek (1929, p. 4) argues that corroboration of a theory does not 
mean that it is true. These two methodological statements show a close resemblance to the ideas 
of Popper, while the second is in flagrant contradiction with Mises's apriorism. The resemblance 
between Hayek and Popper, Huussen argues, can best be explained by the influence Ernst Mach 
exerted on both scientists. Mach had argued that (to put it in Popperian terms) refutations do 
not constitute regrettable events, but rather lead to the growth of knowledge.24 This is very 
much at odds with Misesian apriorism. But how then to explain a statement Hayek made in his 
1935 article 'Socialist Calculation'? In this article Hayek stated that "... the essential basic facts 
which we need for the explanation of social phenomena are part of common experience, part of 
the stuff of our thinking. In the social sciences it is the elements of the complex phenomena 
which are known beyond the possibility of dispute. ... The existence of these elements is so 
much more certain than any regularities in the complex phenomena to which they give rise that 
it is they which constitute the truly empirical factor in the social sciences. ... They [the social 
sciences] are, so to speak, empirically deductive sciences, proceeding from the known elements 
to the regularities in the complex phenomena which cannot be directly established" (p. 217). This 
may seem to show considerable similarities with Mises's apriorism, although Hayek's reference 
to 'the essential basic facts' as 'truly empirical' may seem to be somewhat puzzling in this 
regard. But, as Huussen (1990, p. 122) argues, Hayek I's (so-called) apriorism is not Kantian but 
rather resembles Mach's 'empirio-criticism'. In his opinion, 'empirio-criticism', that is Mach's 
critique of 'pure experience', eliminates essentialistic noüons such as 'das Ding an sich'. It 
reduces all physical or psychological 'things' to perceptions or 'elements'. These elements are 
mental nor physical', they are neutral. Therefore, Mach's 'empirio-criticism' is also called 'neutral 
monism' (Huussen (1990, p. 123)). The neutral elements may be grouped by using two different 
orders, namely one mental and one physical. That is, the neutral elements may be viewed in a 
physical or a psychological context or order. This means that the outside and the inside world, 
Mach (1905 (1920), p. 116, italics in original) stresses that 'Erkenntnis und Irrtum fliessen 
aus denselben psychischen Quellen; nur der Erfolg vermag beide zu scheiden. Der klar erkannte 
Irrtum ist als Korrektiv ebenso erkenntnisfördend wie die positive Erkenntnis.' And "[d]ie wesentli-
che Funktion einer Hypothese besteht darin, da/3 sie zu neuen Beobachtungen führt, wodurch 
undere Vermutung bestatigt, widerlegt oder modifiziert, kurz die Erfahrung erweitert wird. ... 
Die Hypothese führt also in ihrer selbstzerstörenden Funktion endlich zum begrifflichen Ausdruck 
der Tatsachen" (Mach (1905 (1920), p. 240, 248), italics in original). 
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both being theoretical constructs, consist of the same neutral elements. Mach implicitly assumed 
that there is a 'one-to-one correspondence' between both orders. However, the same stimuli may 
lead to different perceptions. This indicates that there need not be such correspondence.25 The 
question then remains why both constructs are not always completely identical. According to 
Huussen (1990, p. 123), this question provides us with the key to Hayek's methodology. In nis 
opinion Hayek tries to solve the problem by viewing both constructs as means of perception, 
that is, as ways of looking at 'reality' (or, in Kantian terms, 'das Ding an sich'). Furthermore, 
these means of perception are also means of dassification. When looking at reality, we classify 
the observations as either physical or psychological. As Seligman (1971, p. 17) stated "[f]or 
Hayek, perception, located in the individual nervous system, is the basis of mental constructs, so 
that meaning and experience represent nothing more than ordered perception. Mind is but a 
sequence of events unrelated to extemal environment; thus, one can never really know objective 
reality." Combined with Hayek's pre-1937-work, this interpretation of Hayek not only enables 
Huussen to explain the quotation given above, it also facilitates our understanding of Hayek's 
struggle against 'sdentism', that is, the view that the sodal sdences must adopt the methods of 
the natural sdences. Sdentism interprets all 'elements' as being physical, thereby eliminating the 
psychological dassification system which explains observations teleologically. As Huussen (1990, 
p. 124) condudes, Hayek's struggle against sdentism was not so much a struggle against the 
methods of natural sdence; it was a struggle against 'physical reductionism'. 
The question whether Hayek views a priori propositions as analytic or synthetic and 
whether he thinks human action to be the fundamental category may now be answered as 
follows. Whereas in Hutchison's view Hayek I would regard human action as a synthetic a priori 
proposition while Hayek II would view it as an analytic (hence a priori) proposition, Huussen 
rejects the 'U-turn' in Hayek's thoughts on methodology and philosophy of sdence. In nis view 
there is no need to distinguish between Hayek I and Hayek II; both view human action as a 
means of dassifying sense impressions. In other words, the physical and the mental order are 
both dassification schemes, which need not correspond with each other. Thus, physical events 
need not be identical to their mental equivalents, or stated differently, people may think that 
they are doing something different than they in fact do. This confronts the sdentist with a 
problem: as the facts of the sodal sdences are what people think they are, how can the sodal 
sdentist know these facts? He cannot infer them from the ways people act, because of the 
absence of the one-to-one correspondence. Things may not be what they seem to be. In 
Huussen's (1990, p. 125) opinion, Hayek's solution to this problem is that he distinguishes be-
tween 'understanding* (Verstenen) and 'explaining'. Understanding is directed towards knowledge 
concerning 'other minds', that is, it is the explanation of sodal interaction. 'Explaining' means 
constructing hypothetical models out of taxonomie, a priori elements, leading to empirically 
Hayek's The Sensory Order (1952, p. 3) is a critique of Mach's implidt assumption that 
there is a 'simple one-to-one correspondence' between the physical and psychological contexts. 
Cf. also Hayek (1943, section 1). 
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meaningless, though cognitively significant classification schemes. The schemes must be supple-
mented by empirical 'data', which are constituted by the results of human evaluation.26 These 
results must be interpreted by the social scientist in order to 'understand' them. This involves 
introspection, which cannot lead to universally valid claims because of the non-existence of 
inductive logic. 
The action axiom then is the aprioristic, tautological, empirically meaningless but 
cognitively significant classification scheme which orders the neutral elements in a mental order. 
It constitutes a way of looking at 'reality\ In order to be empirically meaningful, it must be 
supplemented by empirical 'data'. These data may be derived introspectively and are regarded by 
Hayek as contingent. 
In conclusion, Huussen's explanation seems more plausible than Hutchison's, because it 
is consistent with Hayek's earlier as well as his later work.27 
252. LACHMANN 
Ludwig Lachmann (1978, p. 11), a student of Hayek at the London School of Economics, 
stresses the similarities between the Neo-Austrian methodology and that of Max Weber. The 
latter tried to combat 'historicism' by arguing that in the social sciences existed as much scope 
for generalization as in the natura! sciences (Lachmann (1951, p. 413)). Moreover, in his view 
history logically presupposes "... a generalised scheme of cause and effect." Weber's second 
purpose was to uphold the methodological independence of the social sciences from the natural 
sciences. He tried to achieve this by using the concept of 'Idealtypus' (ideal type). This concept 
is the starting point of his methodology. However, Lachmann (1970, pp. 2 6 - 2 7 ) thinks it 
insufficiënt. In his view "[t]he ideal type is essentially a measuring rod. When we use an ideal 
type we stand at a distance from reality, but for precisely this reason are able to gain knowledge 
of it: ... In other words, the ideal type serves the purpose of ordering concrete phenomena in 
terms of their distance to it." However, the ideal type does not refer to human action. This 
phenomenon, Lachmann (1970, pp. 11 - 12, 29 - 30) argues, is characterized by its 'goal-
directedness'. Therefore, he replaces Weber's ideal type by the notion of the plan, because in 
order to act man has to make plans. The analysis of these plans make the social sciences differ 
from the natural sciences. Whereas the latter studies phenomena as phenomena of nature, the 
While explaining the need for propositions concerning the expectations formation process 
and the underlying information acquiring process, Hayek says that "... my main contention will 
be that the tautologies, of which formal equilibrium analysis essentially consists, can be turned 
into propositions which teil us anything about causation in the real world only in so far as we 
are able to fill those formal propositions with definite statements about how knowledge is 
acquired and communicated. In short, I shall contend that the empirical element in economie 
theory ... consists of propositions about the acquisition of knowledge." (Hayek (1937, p. 33)) 
27
 E.g. Hayek's method of constructing his business cycle theory, which differed fundamen-
tally from Mises's in that he explained business fluctuations in terms of endogenous processes, 
whüe the latter had to refer to exogenous disturbances. Cf. Huussen (1990, pp. 120 - 121). 
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former interprets phenomena as products of plans.28 The axiom of human action then is a 
means of interpreting human action, a dassification scheme. The question here is whether this 
dassification scheme has the same status as the categories of time and space. Lachmann (1951, 
pp. 415 -16) denies this by stating that "... it is possible to side with Professor Mises without 
taking sides [between positivists and Neo-Kantians] on the wider issue [concerning the question 
whether we can have synthetic a priori knowledge], For we can, and in our opinion must, 
distinguish between different layers of experience. ... We may therefore say that, whatever the 
source of knowledge from which the distinction is ultimately derived, means and ends are indeed 
'logically and temporally antecedent' to the household and business plans which economists 
study. They may have their root in a layer of (juvenile?) experience, but it is a layer which 
precedes and underlies the layer with which we are concerned." Lachmann here seems to argue 
that sense impressions (experience) are the source of all knowledge. Some knowledge is 
obtained earlier than other and may create an underlying layer, a foundation, for later experi-
ence. The fact that human beings act constitutes such an underlying layer of experience. In this 
sense the action axiom is an a posteriori proposition, although it is a priori to the layer of 
experience with which economics is concerned. Surprisingly, Selgin (1988, p32) argues, referring 
to classroom communication, that "Lachmann accepts Hayek's description of praxeology as 
essentially formal and tautological, requiring for its fruitful application to catallactics supplemen-
tary hypotheses regarding the use and dissemination of knowledge. Thus, he views Hayek's 1937 
essay [i.e., 'Economics and Knowledge'] as 'an attempt to set Mises straight'." If we relate 
Selgin's remarks to those of Lachmann himself, it seems that Lachmann holds that propositions 
formed by underlying layers of experience are formal and tautological when considered on the 
level with which economics is concerned. For want of a better term, we shall call them on this 
level analytic propositions. 
2.6. CONCLUSIONS 
In condusion, the Neo-Austrian position on the logica! foundation of the action axiom may be 
summarized by discerning three currents. The first, represented by Mises, regards the axiom to 
be a synthetic a priori proposition in the Kantian sense. The second current holds an essentialist 
interpretation by arguing that the axiom is a self-evident truth. The interpretations of the axiom 
by these two currents imply that it is universaüy valid and empirically meaningful. Both currents 
hold that the action axiom is true yet (potentially) empirically meaningful. Therefore, we shall 
28
 Or, in Lachmann's (1951, p. 415, italics in original) words, "... the 'real things' about 
which we learn from Praxeology are human actions. They can be studied in two ways: we can 
study them, as it were, 'from outside', by observation and experience, like other phenomena of 
nature; or we can study them 'from inside', that is to say, we interpret them as the products of 
plans, as manifestations of a directing and controlling mind." 
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combine them and refer to this combination as the dogmatic Austrian view.29 The third, 
represented by Hayek and Lachmann, disagrees because it considers the axiom to be tautological 
and fonnal, hence empirically meaningless (although cognitively significant), at least when 
considered on the level of experience with which economics is concerned. In Kantian terms, the 
axiom must then be an analytic a priori proposition, which must be supplemented by empirical 
data in order to become empirically meaningful. This second current thus denies the dogmatic 
claim on truth. Therefore, we shall refer to it as the relativistic, or revisionistic, current. 
Obviously, the differences between dogmatic and revisionistic Neo-Austrians will have some 
consequences for the respective positions on the role of empirical testing. 
3. AUSTRIAN METHODOLOGICAL TENETS 
3.1. INTRODUCTION 
Praxeology, the analysis of human action, is concerned with the universal aspects of action. It 
strives to disregard the particular aspects of each action. Starting point of the analysis is the 
rationality postulate, which holds that all action is directed towards a goal, i.e,, that it is rational. 
This postulate has some implications which are very important for Neo-Austrian methodology, as 
they form the fundamental characteristics of Neo-Austrian thought. They prescribe the principles 
according to which Neo-Austrian theories must be constructed. These methodological tenets are 
(1) methodological individualism, (2) methodological singularism, (3) radical subjectivism, and (4) 
methodological dualism. These tenets will be discussed in this order. Additionally, attention is 
given to the Austrian position concerning the role of empirical testing and the goals of science. 
This section ends by reviewing some modern developments in Neo-Austrian methodology. 
3.2. METHODOLOGICAL INDIVIDUALISM 
3.2.1. THE CONCEPT OF METHODOLOGICAL INDIVIDUALISM 
Lukes (1968 (1973), p. 124) argued that there are several forms of methodological individualism. 
Their central tenet is the assertion that "... all attempts to explain social and individual 
phenomena are to be rejected ... unless they refer exclusively to facts about individuals." In his 
elaborate critique 'On Austrian Methodology', Nozick (1977, p. 353) also uses this definition 
when he states that "[tjhe methodological individualist claims that all true theories of social 
science are reducible to theories of individual human action, plus boundary conditions specifying 
The term dogmatic as used here does not imply a (negative) normative value judgment. 
It is merely chosen to express its adherents' claims as regards the truth status of the axiom. This 
claim is anti-relativistic and anti-sceptical, hence in a sense dogmatic. 
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the conditions under which persons act." Boland (1986, p. 10) and Huussen (1988, p. 152) also 
use this definition. Methodological individualism thus is a form of reductionism as opposed to 
holism or, more in particular, collectivism. Collectivists argue that man is a sodal being. In their 
view the notion of an individual is meaningless in the sense that man is a member of a sodal 
whole and a product of sodal evolution. His actions are constrained by his sodal environment. 
The constraints take the form of norms, values, laws, etc. This culminates in the view that these 
constraints and therefore the sodal wholes must be logically and temporally prior to the 
individual and his actions. This leads to the condusion that economics must study man in terms 
of collective entities (apart from natural givens). 
One of the basic tenets of Neo-Austrianism is its methodological individualism. Hayek 
(1943 (1949)) pointed out that these sdences aim at building patterns of relationship between 
many individuals (p. 59). And these patterns should be built from elements, which are constitu-
ted by the individuals' behaviour towards their environment. This seems to imply methodological 
individualism. This view is also expressed by Mises (1949 (1966) pp. 41 - 43) and Lachmann 
(1977, p. 93). Yet, Neo-Austrians reject all other reductionist daims, such as the daim that 
man's behaviour must be reduced to chemical processes. The reason for this rejection is, as 
Block (1980, p. 398) stated, that in their view "... there is simply no equivalence between the 
thoughts, feelings, pains, purposes, and plans which make up the reality of acting individuals, on 
the one hand, and the constructs of physics and neurophysiology, on the other." Neo- Austrians 
order the world around them in a teleologicalist rather than physicalist way. They explain sodal 
phenomena in terms of individual goals and consider the question whether the whole or its parts 
are logically and temporally prior to be vain. According to Mises (1949 (1966), p. 42), "[l]ogi-
cally the notions of a whole and its parts are correlative. As logical concepts they are both apart 
from time." The question then is why we should employ methodological individualism. 
322. REASONS FOR ADHERENCE TO METHODOLOGICAL INDIVIDUALISM 
Neo-Austrians adopt methodological individualism for three reasons. The first and most stringent 
reason is an ontological one. They claim that collective or sodal wholes are mind-constructs, 
which enable us to order the chaotic world around us. They do not exist in reality, whereas the 
individual does. Therefore, they do not possess rankings of preferences: only individuals do. It is 
individuals who choose and act, not groups. Of course, individual behaviour may be influenced 
by the drcumstances in which it is carried out, induding expected reactions from other individ-
uals. But such an influence only means that the individual is confronted with other external 
conditions (and, perhaps, even changes his ranking of preferences); it still is only the individual 
who exists, deddes to act, and therefore chooses.30 This underpinning of methodological 
As Keizer (1986, p. 24) argues, "... no collective entity has a real, concrete existence of 
its own. They are not living organisms and cannot experience wants. They have no preferences 
of their own, apart from those of their individual members. All collective entities are the sums 
of their parts, if we indude the interrelationships between the parts." 
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individualism may be called ontological individualism: in reality only the individual exists, not the 
social whole, and therefore only the individual acts. As ontological individualism implies 
knowledge of 'reality as it is', only (Aristotelian) essentialistic Neo-Austrians may adhere to it. 
Secondly, if collective wholes exists, this becomes discernible only in the actions of 
individuals. Or if we acknowledge that we cannot know 'das Ding an sich', then the only thing 
we can observe is individual acting. According to Mises (1949 (1966), pp. 42 - 43), we cannot 
visualize collective wholes; we can only see a crowd, that is, a multitude of individuals. We 
cannot see a soccer team playing; we can only see severai individuals playing a game. There-
fore, Mises (1949 (1966), p. 42) concludes, "... the way to a cognition of collective wholes is 
through an analysis of the individuals' actions." This reason for methodological individualism may 
be called observational individualism. It is this argument that is most frequently used by Neo-
Austrians in their defense of methodological individualism. 
According to Keizer (1986, p. 24), methodological individualism may also be defended 
on normative grounds. That is, by arguing that the individual is the measure of everything. This 
normative individualism argues that one ought to adhere to methodological individualism, because 
otherwise the individual will become of minor importance relative to the social whole (as was 
the case under Nazism and Stalinism). Neo-Austrians, as libertarians, also seem to adhere to this 
defense (albeit often only implicitly). 
323. THE STARTING LEVEL OF ANALYSIS 
Neo-Austrians argue that all theory must start at the micro-level.31 However, one may question 
the logical validity of this prescription, as Nozick (1977) does. He states that methodological 
individualism as described above indeed tells us that macrotheories must have microfoundations 
but that it does not teil us whether we must start our analysis at either the micro- or the 
macro-level. In his view, a social scientific macrotheory cannot be condemned only because it 
does not have microfoundations (yet). As he concludes, "... it appears that no consequences need 
follow from the thesis of methodological individualism about what our attitude should be to any 
given as yet unreduced macrotheory of social science" (p. 361, italics in origjnal). 
However, Block (1980, p. 407 - 08) points out that we cannot and must not equate 
methodological individualism with the reducibility of macroeconomics to microeconomics: "[fjor 
the claim of the Austrians is that although microeconomics is correct in its own terms, able to 
31
 This procedure was already prescribed by Menger (1883 (1969) p. 87). He stated that 
"[d]ie Phanomene der 'Volkswirthschaft' sind ... die Resultante all der unzahtigen einzeln-
wirthschaftlichen Bestrebungen im Volke ... Die Phanomene der 'Volkswirthschaft' mussen 
vielmehr, gleichwie sie sich uns in der Wirklichkeit als Resultante einzelnwirthschafdicher 
Bestrebungen darstellen, auch unter diesem Gesichtpunkte theoretisch interpretirt werden. ... 
Wer die Erscheinungen der 'Volkswirthschaft', jene complicirten Menschheitsphanomene, welche 
wir mit dem obigen Ausdrucke zu bezeichnen gewöhnt sind, theoretisch verstehen will, muss 
deshalb auf ihxe wahre Elemente, auf die Singularwirthschaften im Volke zurückgehen und die 
Gesetze zu erforschen suchen, nach welchen die erstern aus den letztern sich aufbauen. Wer 
aber den entgegengesetzten Weg einschlagt, ... bewegt sich auf der Grundlage einer Fiktion ..." 
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tracé phenomena back to the causal agents (individual dedsions), macroeconomics indudes only 
artifidal constructs which, apart from the individual choices upon which they are very indirectly 
based, have no causal explanatory power on their own" (italics in original). This leads him to 
condude that "[i]t is not true that statements in the two spheres are translatable in terms of 
each other. One is built up out of artifidal aggregations, divorced from human purpose and 
action, and limited to statistical correlations between such constructs. The other suffers from no 
such drawbacks. The equivalence hypothesis, then, must be rejected." The 'fact' that macro-
theory does and microtheory does not indude only artifidal mental constructs, means that 
Block's defense of the methodological prescription is at least a variant of observationaL and 
perhaps even ontologicaL individualism. 
3.3. METHODOLOGICAL SINGULARISM 
The Austrian school holds that individuals continuously act. Praxeology is only interested in the 
individual because he acts. These actions are its research object, and praxeology tries to unravel 
the universal in these concrete actions. This means that it need not take into account all 
accidental and environmental features. It distracts from the influences of time and place. This is 
not to say that everything action is isolated. By contrast, Mises (1949 (1966), p. 45) holds that 
actions form a chain in the endeavours to reach a 'higher' or more far-reaching end. The partial 
actions, which together form the further-reaching action, must be executed step by step. Mises 
(1949 (1966), pp. 45 - 46) uses the example of the action which aims to build a cathedral. This 
further-reaching action can be divided into a chain of several partial actions, such as the actions 
of the mason or the bricklayer. 
Action takes place in an environment, which imposes limits on the specific courses of 
action, which can be undertaken. A universal feature of action is that it can never be carried out 
under identical drcumstances. In other words, every action is a unique event. It cannot be 
repeated under identical drcumstances. This position is called methodological singularism. 
The uniqueness of every action has an important consequence for the method of 
analysis. It means that Neo-Austrians cannot make use of probability distributions. The use of 
these distributions presupposes that the instances of the phenomenon under consideration are to 
a large degree identical and repeatable. Although Neo-Austrians would readily agree with the 
view that in the abstract all human actions are similar (namely in the sense that all actors try to 
attain a future set of drcumstances which they expect to be better than the one that would arise 
without the action), their methodological singularism prohibits the treatment of actions as 
repeatable. 
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3.4. RADICAL SUBJECTIVISM 
3.4.1. THE SUBJECnVE DATA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 
From its very beginnings the Austrian School adhered to a subjective value theory. White (1984, 
p. 4) even claims that 'subjectivism' unifies the Austrian school. Subjectivism in its broadest 
sense can be defined as the position which holds that at least some of the data of the social 
sciences are constituted by the views of the economie agents. As Mises (1949 (1966), p. 395) 
points out, "[i]n human action nothing counts but the various individuals' desires for the 
attainment of ends. With regard to the choice of these ends there is no question of truth; all 
that matters is value. Value judgments are necessarily always subjective ..." 
Praxeology takes human action as its starting point. Action, as Mises defines it, implies 
choice. Man chooses between various opportunities and the outcome of this choice will depend 
on his subjective valuation of the alternatives. These valuations form the facts of the social 
sciences. They cannot be 'objectified', because there is no common denominator. Rothbard 
(1962, pp. 15 - 16) makes clear that "[i]t is important to realize that there is never any 
possibility of measuring increases or decreases in happiness or satisfaction. Not only is it impos-
sible to measure or compare changes in the satisfaction of different people; it is not possible to 
measure changes in the happiness of any given person. In order for any measurement to be 
possible, there must be an etemally fixed and objectively given unit with which other units may 
be compared. There is no such objective unit in the field of human valuation. The individual 
must determine subjectively for himself whether he is better or worse off as a result of any 
change." In other words, utility cannot be compared interpersonally or intertemporally. Of 
course, this does not mean that an individual cannot compare utility of present and future goals 
at a given point in time. Such Utilities can only be 'measured' on an ordinal scale, not on a 
cardinal one. This view is called ordinalism. 
The fact that the data of the social sciences can be called subjective has also another 
corollary, namely the dispersion of knowledge. As Hayek (1952b (1979) pp. 49 - 50, italics in 
original) states, "... the term subjective stresses another important fact ...: ... the knowledge and 
beliefs of different people, while possessing that common structure which makes communication 
possible, will yet be different and often conflicting in many respects. ... It only exists in the 
dispersed, incomplete, and inconsistent form in which it appears in many individual minds, and 
the dispersion and imperfection of all knowledge are two of the basic facts from which the 
social sciences have to start." Obviously, this imperfection derives from the unknowability of the 
future. As the action axiom already implies this unknowability, it also encompasses the 
imperfection of knowledge. Obviously, this does not have implications for the homogeneity of the 
individuals' knowledge. Imperfect knowledge may still be homogeneous. However, Neo-Austrians 
claim that the individuals' knowledge is not only imperfect but also heterogeneous. In Neo-
Austrian parlance, this feature is called the dispersion of knowledge. It is made plausible by the 
tenet of radical subjectivism. After all, the homogeneity of knowledge would imply that all 
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individuals would know each other's valuations. This is highly improbable. Hence, at least the 
individuals' knowledge as regards their valuations will differ. This means that knowledge will be 
heterogeneous across markets and individuals. 
3.4.2. STATIC VERSUS DYNAMIC SUBJECTTVISM 
Subjectivism was not introduced into Austrian economics as a completely mature concept. 
Kirzner (1988) argued that Austrian thought on the market process developed during the 
economie calculation debate.32 This debate shed more light on the meaning of the Austrian 
notion of the market process as a discovery process. This notion had also some implications for 
that of subjectivism; it gradually became clear what the Neo-Austrians meant by it. Or rather, 
post-Misesian Austrians recognized that Mises's notion of subjectivism was unable to grasp the 
importance of expectations. Lachmann (1982, p. 37) argued that Mises failed to grasp the 
opportunity of incorporating expectations into his analysis because subjectivism "... meant to him 
no more than that different men pursue different ends. ... The ends themselves ... we have to 
regard as 'given'." Mises's analysis can be interpreted as a pure logic of choice. It did not permit 
him to consider the incorporation of expectations into his analysis an important step forward (cf. 
Mises (1949 (1966), p. 21)). Boehm (1982, p. 46) explains this when arguing that "... a type of 
explanation that purports to explain human actions by reconstructing the situation in which the 
actor found himself and by then stating that the overt purposeful behavior was as prescribed by 
the logic of choice cannot adequately handle expectations." He concludes that "[t]he framework 
of the logic of choice does not allow for considerations of time" (p. 47, italics in original). In this 
respect the Hayekian, Kirznerian and Lachmannian theories concerning the acquisition and 
dissemination of knowledge can be interpreted as attempts to elaborate on Mises and to fill the 
gap in his analysis. 
O'Driscoli and Rizzo (1985, p. 22) distinguish between static and dynamic subjectivism. 
In their view, static subjectivism considers the mind "as a passive filter through which the data of 
dedsion-making are perceived. To the extent that this filter can be known, the whole process of 
decision-making is perfectly determinate." In other words, the pure logic of choice is situationally 
deterministic. The Robbinsian economizer is the prototype in economics of the static-subjectivistic 
decision-maker. Dynamic subjectivism, on the other hand, "views the mind as an active, creative 
entity in which decision-making bears no determinate relationship to what went before" (italics in 
original).33 This form of subjectivism States that the actor sees his own decision-making as 
indeterminate and, therefore, cannot be in a position to predict bis actions. The reason for this 
is twofold. Firstly, the individual cannot know his future knowledge, and therefore bis future ac-
For an account of this debate, see e.g. Lavoie (1985). 
33
 Latsis (1976) distinguishes between single-exit and multiple-exit decision situations. In the 
former the outcome of the decision-making process is completely determinate. In the latter type 
of decision situations it is indeterminate. 
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tions must be unknown (hence indeterminate). Secondly, the ability to foresee one's own 
dedsion at a certain point in the future logically precludes the ability to decide at that point in 
time because this would mean that the decision can be known and therefore already must have 
been made (p. 25). In the dynamic-subjectivistic view, decisions cannot be treated as flowing 
inescapably out of the objective circumstances. It emphasizes, as Shackle (1972) argued, the 
creativity and indeterminacy of human decisions. The static-subjectivistic position, on the other 
hand, hardly implies any choice at all. Whereas in a static-subjectivistic framework individuals 
are faced with a given means-ends framework without any learning process, in a dynamic-
subjectivistic environment they continuously adapt their knowledge and expectations to changing 
circumstances. According to O'Driscoll and Rizzo (1985, pp. 9 - 10), "Austrians have stressed the 
view of the market process as an engine of discovery ... Learning, for Austrians, is not merely 
plugging in new values of variables in an otherwise unchanging learning function. It involves a 
structural shift in knowledge, ix., a change in the learning functions themselves. The market 
process is both the source and the manifestation of these structural changes ..." 
Although Neo-Austrian economists always adhered to a more or less dynamic form of 
subjectivism, the respective analyses of Lachmann (1982) and Boehm (1982) show that Neo-
Austrians differ among each other as to the meaning attached to this concept. Both authors 
interpret the Neo-Austrian revival in the 1970s as a revival of a more dynamic-subjectivistic Neo-
Austrianism: "[t]he radical subjectivism that inspired the Neo-Austrian revival of the 1970s is a 
subjectivism of active minds. The mental activity of ordering and formulating ends, allocating 
means to them, making and revising plans, determining when action has been successful, all 
these are its forms of expression." 'Post-Misesian' Neo-Austrians have shifted emphasis from 
preferences to expectations and the knowledge-acquisition process, thereby following Hayek's 
(1937) line of research. O'Driscoll and Rizzo (1985, p. 28 - 29), in particular, have made this 
clear by emphasizing that the constituent parts of choice are (1) the ordinal ranking of goals or 
wants, (2) knowledge of the relationship between courses of action and want satisfaction, (3) 
knowledge of prices (or, more generally, terms on which the alternatives are offered, i.e. trade-
offs), and (4) knowledge of the (income) constraint. At the same time, these factors determine 
choice. This leads them to ask the question, "[i]f the determinants of choice do not exist except 
as constituent parts of the choice, how do individuals choose? Goals in a disembodied sense can 
exist prior to choice; it is only the finalized ranking that does not. The individual, in his 
imagination, projects the likely consequences of different courses of action, including what must 
be sacrificed to achieve them ... In this process, the individual clarifies his ranking of imagined 
consequences, his knowledge of the relationship between particular courses of action and those 
ranked consequences, and his perception of prices and income. The point at which the ranking 
and perceptions are finalized is, or constitutes, the point of decision." The four constituent parts 
exist simultaneously and therefore do not determine the decision in any causal sense, because 
this would require them to be temporally prior to the choice. Moreover, as O'Driscoll and Rizzo 
(1985, p. 29), among others, noted, "jw]hat an individual decides to do depends, in large part, on 
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what he expects other individuals to decide. Therefore, it is impossible to examine adequately 
the nature of decision-making without paying attention to the content of expectations." Neo-
Austrian sübjectivism has thus become more dynamic in the sense that it extends the analysis 
from the means and given ends to the knowledge acquisition and expectations upon which they 
are based. 
3.5. METHODOLOGICAL DUAIISM 
A fourth major Neo-Austrian tenet is its methodological dualism, which is the view that the 
social sciences should not adopt the research methods of the natural sciences. Neo-Austrians 
have very much protested against such an adoption, which they think to be based on a scientistic 
prejudice.3* The Neo-Austrian rejection of scientism can be interpreted as a corollary of three 
aspects of Neo-Austrian analysis, namely (1) individualism, (2) sübjectivism, and (3) the method 
of Versteken. Furthermore, it also depends on the Neo-Austrian view on the method of research 
as used in the natural sciences. This view is best characterized as analytic. 
Firstly, we discuss the former three reasons for methodological dualism. Subsequently, 
the analytic method of research is elaborated and confronted with the Neo-Austrian alternative, 
that is, the synthetic or composiüve method. 
3.5.1. AGAINST SCIENTISM 
Methodological individualism is a form of reductionism, as opposed to collectivism (cf. section 
3.2.). Hayek (1952b (1979)) argues that collective entities do not exist in social reality, or cannot 
be observed, to say the least. He thus adheres to observational individualism, which implies that 
we cannot derive genera! laws describing the entities by merely observing them. Instead, entities 
such as capitalism (as a given historical 'phase'), society or government are merely hypostatizati-
ons. They are groups of structurally related elements. And individualism tells us that in the 
social world these elements are individuals. Hence, it is obvious that Neo-Austrians prescribe 
that all explanations of social phenomena should reduce them to their constituent parts (i.e. to 
the individuals under consideration). 
Secondly, Neo-Austrian radical sübjectivism rejects the objectivism of the natural 
sciences. The latter holds that the data of the natural sciences are 'objective', in the sense that 
they are independent of any subject (or individual). Identical external stimuli then produce 
physically similar effects. However, such stimuli may affect individuals differently. In other words, 
the individuals' (re)actions may differ, even though the causes are physically identical. These 
Hayek (1952b (1979) p. 24) defines scientism as the position that leads to the "slavish 
imitation of the method and language of [natural] Science." In his opinion, it is "... an attitude 
which is decidedly unscientific in the true sense of the word, since it involves a mechanical and 
uncritical application of habits of thought to fields different from those in which they have been 
fonned." 
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differences can then be explained by the fact that the data of the social sciences are not 
objective, hence subjective, in the sense that they consist of the views which individuals hold. 
Social scientists must constantly keep in mind "... that the 'facts' are different from 'appearances' 
(Hayek (1952b (1979) p. 31)). They cannot restrict themselves to the analysis of how physically 
identical stimuli affect human behaviour. Instead, they study patterns of behaviour. This means 
that they do not concentrate on the effects of identical causes, but rather on the similar effects 
of possibly different causes. They are interested in behaviour which is caused by stimuli which 
people think are similar. The question then arises, how social scientists can know whether 
individuals regard some stimuli as different or as identical. In other words, what procedure must 
social scientists follow in order to determine the individuals' classification of their sense 
impressions. The procedure employed by Neo-Austrians is the method of Versteken. 
Hayek (1952a, p. 26) argued that "... in his conscious decisions man classifies external 
stimuli in a way which we can know solely from our own subjective experience of this kind of 
classification. We take it for granted that other men treat various things as alike or unlike just 
as we do, although no objective test, no knowledge of the relations of these things to other parts 
of the external world justifies this. Our procedure is based on the experience that other people 
as a rule (though not always - ...) classify their sense impressions as we do. ... But we not only 
know this. It would be impossible to explain or understand human action without making use of 
this knowledge." In Hayek's view, the social scientist cannot but try to understand the agents, 
otherwise a teleological explanation would be impossible. Such understanding is regarded as 
possible because as a rule human beings classify their sense impressions more or less similarly. 
This provides the social scientist, as a human being, with a 'ke/ which enables him to translate 
observed behaviour into statements about plans on which such behaviour is supposed to be 
based. In other words, the method of Versteken can be used in order to interpret the agents' 
actions as resulting from a plan. As Lachmann (1970, p. 30) concluded, "... we may say that we 
are able to give an 'intelligent account' of human action by revealing the plans which guide it, a 
task beyond the grasp of the natural scientist. The mere fact that this possibility exists is the 
foundation of the method of interpretation and thus offers a vindication of the plea for the 
methodological autonomy of the social sciences." 
3.5.2. THE ANALYHC VERSUS THE COMPOSITIVE METHOD 
Methodological dualism claims that the methods of research used in the social sciences should 
differ from those of the natural sciences. This means that methodological dualists must have 
some view on the latter methods. In particular, Hayek (1952b (1979)) has discussed them 
extensively. He argues that "... natural scientists ... are used to seek first for empirical regularities 
in the relatively complex phenomena that are immediately given to observation, and only after 
they have found such regularities to try and explain them as the product of a combination of 
Such similar classification is, of course, also the basis for meaningful communication. 
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other, often purely hypothetical, elements (constructs) which are assumed to behave according to 
simpler and more general rules" (p. 71). The laws and specific circumstances concerning the 
system as a whole are derived inductively, that is, by generalizing observations. The behaviour of 
the elements is derived from the behaviour of the system as a whole, because the latter can be 
observed while the former cannot. The main task of the natural sciences is to recognize the 
particular as an instance of an inductively derived general mie (p. 29).30 As the particular is 
explained in terms of the universal, this method can be called the anafytic method (p. 67). 
Transposed to the social sciences, this scientistic method implies that the individuals' behaviour 
can be explained in terms of laws and circumstances, which apply to society as a whole. These 
laws are also presumed to be derived inductively. 
However, Hayek (1967b, p. 41) claims that there are no 'laws' in the social sciences, as 
there are in the natural sciences. In nis view "... the conception of law in the usual sense has 
little application to the theory of complex phenomena, and that therefore also the description of 
scientifïc theories as 'nomologic' or 'nomothetic' ... is appropriate only to those two-variable or 
perhaps three-variable problems to which the theory of simple phenomena can be reduced but 
not to the theory of phenomena which appear only above a certain level of complexity".37 Thus, 
the absence of genuine (universally valid) laws in the social sciences can be attributed to the 
complexity of the data of the social sciences. This greater complexity can be expressed in terms 
of the "number of elements of which an instance of the pattern must consist in order to exhibit 
all the characteristic attributes of the class of patterns in question" (Hayek (1967b) p. 2S).38 In 
other words, the number of variables which must be used in order to describe a system is taken 
as the measure for complexity. Hayek continues by arguing that the animate and social 
phenomena are 'more highly organized' and hence more complex than the inanimate phenome-
na. In general, the social sciences study more complex phenomena than the natural sciences. The 
particular manifestation of the social pattern will depend on many more variables than those in 
Popper (1957 (1976)) criticizes Hayek by pointing out that in fact the natural sciences do 
not use this method. He argues that natural laws are conjectures, which are derived deductively. 
Therefore, he redefines scientism as "... the imitation of what certain people mistake for the 
method and language of science" (p. 105n, italics in original). Scientism thus incorporates a 
misconception of the methods of the natural sciences. According to Popper, both the natural and 
the social sciences use the hypothetical-deductive model of explanation. For a discussion of this 
model, see Hempel and Oppenheim (1948) and Hempel (1965 (1970)). 
37
 Hayek (1967b, p. 41) uses the term 'law' in the sense of a "rule by which two phenome-
na are connected with each other according to the prinöple of causality, that is to say, as cause 
and effect." 
38
 Hayek (1967b, p. 23) describes a pattern as a regularity or order. It is a similar feature 
under otherwise different circumstances. And it leads to the problem 'Why is this feature similar 
when the circumstances differ?' Patterns can be described in algebraic equations. In fact, "[e]very 
algebraic equation or set of such equations defines in this sense a class of patterns, with the 
individual manifestation of this kind of pattern being particularized as we substitute definite 
values for the variables" (p. 24). 
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the realm of the natural sdences. Neo-Austrians condude that this should have some consequen-
ces for the method of research to be used in the sodal sdences. They reject the analytic method 
and, instead, adopt the synthetic or compositive method.39 
The compositive method does not explain the behaviour of the elements in reference 
to laws governing the system as a whole. The elements of the sodal sdences can be known, in 
contrast to those in the natural sdences. This means that the sodal sdentist does not need to 
hypothesize on the nature of the elements. He can 'observe' (introspectively) groups of elements, 
which are structurally connected. These groups (systems, wholes) are then reconstructed from 
the known properties of the elements (Hayek (1952b (1979) p. 67). The sodal phenomena can 
then be explained (reconstructed) in terms of their elements (i.e. individuals) and their 
properties. However, any explanation of these phenomena can focus on two aspects, namely their 
formation (origin) and their functioning (operation). The question then seems to be on what 
aspect should the sodal sdences concentrate. In Hayek's view this is not really a problem. He 
argues that the problem of their origin concurs with the problem of the manner of their 
functioning. The explanation of sodal phenomena in terms of their origin and their functioning 
is called a genene explanation (Hayek (1952b (1979) p. 72)). Hempel (1965 (1970) p. 447) 
defines it as an explanation which "... presents the phenomenon under study as the final stage of 
a developmental sequence, and accordingly accounts for the phenomenon by describing the 
successive stages of that sequence."42 A generic explanation thus accounts for a sodal phenome-
Hayek (1952b (1979) p. 67n) explains that he borrowed the term compositive from Carl 
Menger. 
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 Obviously, the compositive method is very much influenced by the Neo-Austrian goal of 
economics as a sodal sdence, namely, to explain sodal phenomena as the unintended conse-
quences of rational human action. This view on these phenomena has been expressed most aptly 
by Ferguson (1767 (1978) p. 122) who describes them as "the result of human action, but not 
the execution of any human design." And Hayek (1952b (1979) p. 69) argues that "[i]f sodal 
phenomena showed no order except insofar as they were consdously designed, there would 
indeed be no room for theoretical sdences of sodety and there would be, as is often argued, 
only problems of psychology." For a more elaborate treatment of the Neo-Austrians' views on 
the goal of economics as a sdence, cf. section 3.7. 
41
 According to Hayek (1967c, p. 101), "... the institutions did develop in a particular way 
because the co-ordination of the actions of the parts which they secured proved more effective 
than the alternative institutions with which they had competed and which they had displaced." 
The formation of the institutions is only considered possible, because it enabled actions to be 
more successful than in the case of rival institutions. In other words, the formation is dependent 
on the way in which the institutions function. Cf. also Menger (1883 (1969) p. 88) who already 
stated that a theory which aims at explaining sodal phenomena should emphasize their origin: 
"Ein jede Theorie strebt demnach vor allem darnach, uns die compheirten Erscheinungen des ihr 
eigentümlichen Forschungsgebietes als Ergebniss des Zusammenwirkens der Faktoren ihrer 
Entstehung verstandlich zu machen. Dies genetische Element ist untrennbar von der Idee 
theoretischer Wissenschaften.* 
42
 Hempel uses the term genetic explanation, instead of generic explanation. We shall adopt 
the latter, as it is the Neo-Austrian term. 
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non by describing how it functions and how it came into existence.43 It should be added that the 
length of the evolutionary process during which the phenomenon came into existence, is of no 
importance. This also applies to whether or not the process is often repeated.44 
The view that social scientists should use generic explanations leads to the question 
how they should proceed when giving such an explanation. One may distinguish three stages (cf. 
Hayek (1955 (1964), pp. 72 - 73) and Huussen (1985) p. 126)). Firstly, the social sdentist tries 
to observe the motivations, knowledge, beliefs, expectations, relations etc. of the individuals. As 
these cannot be observed directly, he uses introspection, that is, he applies the method of 
Versteken. Secondly, he deduces a macro-system from this introspective (micro-)knowledge 
conceming the individuals. This leads to a conjecture of the state of the system as a whole, 
which can be called a model of the system. Thirdly, the sodal sdentist confronts predictions of 
the model with actual behaviour of the system as a whole and its constituting elements. 
Differences between the model behaviour and the actual behaviour must be explained by 
pointing out in what relevant respects reality differs from the model. For instance, model 
predictions may not be corroborated by the facts, because individuals base their actions on 
information which differs from the model information. This means that the informational 
assumptions underlying the predictions have proven to be incorrect. Empirical testing has then 
shown that the particular model under consideration cannot explain the given social facts. 
In section 2 it was stated that many Neo-Austrians consider the rationality postulate as 
a universally valid and (potentially) empirically meaningful proposition. This means that this 
postulate and its logical corollaries need not be tested. However, the third phase of the 
compositive method involves empirical testing. Combined with the dogmatic view of the truth 
In Hayek's view, a generic explanation does not use genera! laws (i.e. is not a nomologi-
cal explanation). However, Hempel formulates them in terms of the covering-law model. He 
holds that "... schematically speaking, a genetic explanation will begin with a pure description of 
an initial stage; thence, it will proceed to an account of a second stage, part of which is 
nomologically linked to, and explained by, the characteristic features of the initial stage, while 
the balance is simply added descriptively because of its relevance for the explanation of some 
parts of the third stage, and so forth." The genetic explanation can then be expressed as follows: 
S1 --> S'2 + D2 = S2 - > S'3 + D3 = S3 - > ... - > S ' ^ + DnA = Sa_t --> Sn, 
in which each arrow indicates a presumptive law-like (nomic) connection between two successive 
stages. The arrows presuppose universal or statistical uniformities. Slf S2, - Sn express "... all the 
information that the genetic account gives about the first, second, ..., nth stage." And Dj, D2, ..., 
T>Bml constitute "... information about further facts which are adduced without explanation, 
because of their explanatory significance for the next stage" (Hempel (1965 (1970) p. 449 - 50)). 
However, he acknowledges that in practice the stages in a genetic explanations cannot be as 
stringently separated as in his scheme. 
44
 Hayek (1952b (1979) p. 71) explidtly states that "[i]t makes no difference for our present 
purpose whether the process extends over a long period of time, as it does in such cases as the 
evolution of money or the formation of language, or whether it is a process which is constantly 
repeated anew, as in the case of the formation of prices or the direction of production under 
competition." 
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status of the action axiom, this means that only revisionists will allow for a role of empirical 
testing. They considered the action axiom a (cognitively significant) tautology, which must be 
supplemented with empirical propositions in order to derive empirically meaningful hypotheses. 
This raises the question what propositions must be tested in the third phase of the compositive 
method. Furthermore, one may wonder whether the dogmatic view is correct in asserting that 
the economie theorems can be derived a priori. The next section will take a closer look at these 
questions as regards the role of empirical testing in Neo-Austrian economics. 
3.6. NEO-AUSTRIAN ECONOMICS AND PREDICTION 
Praxeology deals with the implications of the action axiom. These are regarded as incontestable 
and universally valid, hence it is senseless to test them empirically. The question then arises 
whether this is also the case for the propositions of economics. According to Mises (1949 (1966), 
pp. 232 - 34), economics is the part of the social sciences which is concerned with market 
phenomena. Additionally, it builds on the praxeological theorems. Therefore, the answer to the 
question posed above will depend on the relation between the economie theorems and those of 
praxeology. More predsely, it will depend on the answer to the question whether the economie 
theorems can be derived from the action axiom without the use of auxiliary assumptions. 
3.6.1. AUXILIARY ASSUMPTIONS 
According to Mises (1962 (1978), pp. 5 - 6), "[t]he theorems attained by correct praxeological 
reasoning are not only perfectly certain and incontestable, like the correct mathematical 
theorems. They refer, moreover, with the full rigidity of their apodictic certainty and incontesta-
bility to the reality of action as it appears in life and history. Praxeology conveys exact and 
precise knowledge of real things" (Mises (1949 (1966), p. 39). In his view, praxeology cannot 
reach false conclusions, unless some logjcal error is made. The only reasonable test of praxeolo-
gy thus is a test of its logica! consistency. If the economie theorems could be derived from the 
praxeological postulates without using auxiliary assumptions, they would also be incontestable. 
However, man's economie actions take place in a social environment, the market, which influen-
ces his actions. The features of this environment therefore play a significant role. 
Economics is concerned with the operation of the market. Neo-Austrians acknowledge 
that their conclusions as regards market phenomena cannot be derived from the action axiom 
alone. The praxeological theories built on the action axiom must be combined with auxiliary 
assumptions in order to be able to derive hypotheses concerning market phenomena. Mises 
(1949 (1966), p. 237) discems two auxiliary assumptions, which also seem to state the necessary 
preconditions for the existence of a market. He argues that this existence implies that "... there 
is division of labor and private ownership (control) of the means of production and that conse-
quently there is market exchange of goods and services." Furthermore, all coercive and 
compulsive influences are assumed away. In addition, for economie calculation on the market to 
29 
be rational, he argues, there must exist a universally employed medium of exchange. "If this 
were not the case, it would not be possible to reduce all exchange-relatioiiships to a common 
denominator" (Mises (1933, p. 102)). Such a reduction is necessary in order to assess whether 
some productive activities can be expected to be profitable (p. 106).45 
Rothbard (1957, p. 316) identifies four auxiliary assumptions: (1) there is a variety of 
resources, both natural and human, (2) leisure is a consumer good, (3) exchanges are indirect, 
and (4) firms always aim at maximization of their money profits. According to Hm, the 
fundamental action axiom and the first two supplementary hypotheses suffice to elaborate an 
analysis of 'Crusoe economics'. The incorporation of the third leads to the study of market 
phenomena. The fourth is the least important, because the fundamental action axiom already 
implies that firm owners maximize their psychic profit. Maximization of money profits is in 
Rothbard's view just a minor simplification. Combined with the action axiom these assumptions 
are presumed to suffice in order to derive all economie theorems. Given the supposed apodictic 
certainty of the action axiom, the truth status of the auxiliary assumptions will determine the 
truth status of the theorems. 
In the Neo-Austrian view, the praxeological conclusions are true because they are 
based on the (supposedly true) action axiom. However, this need not be the case for the 
auxiliary axioms. The question concerning their logical status then arises. Rothbard (1957, p. 
316) claims that "... they are so generally true as to be self-evident, as to be seen by all to be 
obviously true once they are stated, and hence they are not in practice empirically falsifiable and 
therefore not 'operationally meaningruT." Empirical testing of the hypothesis then becomes 
senseless. Rothbard (1976, pp. 27 - 28) states that the nature of empirical 'evidence' is "... the 
bringing, by various means, of propositions hitherto doudy and obscure into clear and evident 
view, that is, evident to the scientific observers." In case propositions are self-evident, that is, 
immediatefy evident, to the scientific observers, empirically testing would be senseless. Why 
should we try to make evident what is already evident? Then of course the problem of how to 
assess whether a proposition is self-evident or not, emerges. Rothbard calls the solution to this 
problem the 'boomerang principle' (as RJP. Phillips (1934 - 35, pp. 36-37) did). This principle 
elucidates one of the attributes of a self-evident axiom. It states that any attempt to refute such 
an axiom is in fact self-contradictory. A self-evident axiom returns to us again even though we 
cast it away from us. The axiom of purposeful human action is such a self-evident axiom, 
because the critic who tries to refute it must himself act purposefully and thereby proves the 
axiom. However, this defense of the concept of a self-evident truth is far from convincing, 
because claiming that all critics act rationally does not mean that all men always act rationally, 
or (more specifically) that the market participants under consideration act rationally. The critic is 
45
 Cf. also Mises (1949 (1966) p. 209). 
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 Rothbard (1957, p. 316). However, this minor simplification is inconsistent with Neo-
Austrian radical subjectivism. 
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just one person, so it seems that Rothbard commits a logical fallacy.47 Moreover, it seems 
hardly conceivable that the boomerang prindple applies to the supplementary axioms. After all, 
to deny that leisure is a consumer good does not mean that one is involved in a self-contradicti-
on, because such a denial does not imply that the critic considers nis work dissatisfying.48 
Another assumption Rothbard makes in order to condude that empirical testing of 
economie theories is senseless, is that there must be no other supplementary hypotheses than 
those stated above, or if there are that they must be self-evidently true. This presupposition may 
be questioned, as other Neo-Austrians do. This is shown by the Neo-Austrian debate on the 
matter whether a tendency towards coordination exists. 
3.62. EQUILIBRATION OR COORDINATION 
Mises (1949 (1962), p. 244) pointed out that "... action ultimately aims at bringing about a state 
of affairs in which there is no longer action, whether because all uneasiness has been removed 
or because any further removal of feit uneasiness is out of the question. Action thus tends 
toward a state of rest, absence of action." Hence action is equilibrating, in the sense that it aims 
at making itself superfluous. Any successful action (that is, an action which successfully 
eliminates profit opportunities) implies an equilibrating movement, as seen from the viewpoint of 
the successful actor. On the level of the individual all successful action is equilibrating, because 
it eliminates profit opportunities. It is in this sense that praxeologists regard the proposition that 
action is equilibrating as a priori true. 
However, this does not imply that the individual actions are equilibrating on an 
economy-wide level. In order to prevent confusion between the individual and the general level, 
general equilibrium is called coordination.49 It is the tendency towards coordination, which is 
much disputed between Neo-Austrians. Mises (1949 (1962), pp. 244 - 50) assumed that individual 
equilibrating action would also tend to bring about coordination. The resulting general equilibri-
um ('evenly rotating economy') is characterized by the complete absence of perceived profit 
opportunities. It must be interpreted as a moving target, which will never be reached because it 
moves each time individuals acquire knowledge and/or revise their preferences and plans. In 
other words, the state of coordination will never be reached, although a tendency in its direction 
is claimed to exist. 
The assumption concerning the tendency towards coordination, however, does not 
47
 For a more detailed critidsm of Mises's Human Action and Rothbard's interpretation of 
Mises, see Schuller (1951). 
48
 Additionally, by daiming that the auxiliary assumption are true Rothbard implies that he 
knows the other individuals' valuation (of leisure), which is clearly inconsistent with the Neo-
Austrian tenet of radical subjectivism. 
49
 The distinction between equilibration and coordination was already used by O'Driscoll 
(1977) and Selgin (1988), among others. 
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follow strictly logjcally from the action axiom. This means that it need not be a priori true. 
Hayek (1933a) defined coordination as the situation in which all individuals fulfil their plan: it is 
characterized by perfect knowledge. Individuals then must know (1) the structure of the 
economy, (2) the values of its parameters, and (3) the values of the relevant (endogenous and 
exogenous) variables. It will prevail as long as the individuals' plans (and expectations) continue 
to come true. Hence, intertempoml general equilibnum (coordination) is defined as the situation 
in which individuals possess perfect foresight. The proposition that a tendency towards coordina-
tion exists then presupposes that a tendency towards the acquisition of such knowledge exists. In 
nis (1937b) Hayek changed the definition of coordination, in the sense that merely all relevant 
knowledge is required for plans to be coordinated. However, the problem as regards the 
tendency towards coordination remains the same: How can individuals learn this knowledge? 
Can its answer be merely deduced from the action axiom? 
3.63. THE PROBLEM OF A TENDENCY TOWARDS COORDINATION 
Kirzner (1973) has analyzed the process of competition. Entrepreneurs are seen as being alert, in 
the sense that they look for profit opportunities. These must be discovered by 'peering through 
the fog'. The entrepreneurs will be rewarded or penalized, depending on the correctness of 
their anticipations. Entrepreneurs who are penalized suffer losses. Their creditors will not trust 
them anymore. Their investable funds will become depleted, forcing them to stop their 
entrepreneurial and productive activities. Only successful entrepreneurs will stay in business. As 
Garrison (1986, p. 98) puts it, "[ijnvestors who overextend themselves get caught in a credit 
crunch, suffer losses, and their investments possibly are subject to liquidation." Although 
plausible, the argument is not entirely convincing from a theoretical point of view. One mistake 
by an entrepreneur need not drive him out of the market. Only entrepreneurs who continue to 
be less successful than their opponents will be driven from the market. But why should one 
entrepreneur be better than another? This can be explained in two ways. Firstly, it may be 
assumed that entrepreneurs who have been successful in the past will also be successful in the 
future (and vice versa). Obviously, this involves an inductive fallacy, because past success is no 
guarantee for future success. Secondly, it may be presupposed that entrepreneurs differ in their 
ability to predict the future correctly, that is, to undertake the best activities. Although it is a 
plausible presupposition, it does not follow logjcally from the action axiom. It is a contingent 
proposition, leaving the differences unexplained. 
Nevertheless, many Neo-Austrians seem to believe that a coordinating tendency exists. 
This belief is dismissed by Lachmann (following Shackle). He emphasizes that the existence of 
such a tendency will depend on the individuals' knowledge acquisition and expectations formation 
behaviour. Economists are then faced with a problem: must they assume knowledge to be 
x
 Kirzner's notion of profit opportunities is rather 'objectivist' in the sense that they 
already exist and merely need discovering, as Selgin (1988) remarked. 
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exogenous or endogenous, that is, must they explain (changes in) knowledge held by individuals 
or does it suffice to treat it as a 'datum'? Given its importance in the analysis of a presumed 
tendency towards coordination, Lachmann (1986, p. 28) argues that "[a]s the state of knowledge 
is ever changing it is hard to see how we could treat it as a datum: it is never 'given' to us for 
long. But to treat it as a dependent variable would mean to treat processes of thought as though 
they were predictable. We know that this cannot be done. It thus appears that the problem of 
the significance of knowledge for action constitutes an insunnountable obstade to the conception 
of broad empirical generalizations about human action." Praxeology circumvents the problem by 
assuming the consumers' ends-means framework and their knowledge to be given. However, "... 
in a dynamic world there are economie problems that the logic of choice by itself cannot master. 
While it explains the designing of economie plans under given conditions, the revision of 
economie plans in the course of time, as well as the entire range of the problems of expectati-
ons, are outside the realm of logic" (Lachmann (1977, p. 59)). Future knowledge cannot be 
predicted because this would imply that the knowledge is already available. The difficulty with 
forming predictions is that they can only be based on past and current knowledge. Given the 
changeability of knowledge, there is no reason why the expectations wül turn out to be correct. 
In Lachmann's opinion "[i]t is the ease with which knowledge can be acquired, or may become 
obsolete, which is mainly responsible for the kaleidic nature of the world of human action" (p. 
29). This means that the future is too uncertain to assume that there will be a tendency towards 
correct predictions and correct knowledge. Hence one cannot conclude on a priori grounds that a 
coordinating tendency exists. Boehm (1982, p. 52, note 29) agrees with Lachmann, in the sense 
that he claims that Mises could only give a vivid picture of the market process because he left 
his apriorism behind. Mises's 'pure logic of choice' framework cannot deal with time and 
expectations because it treated preferences as subjective and at the same time as exogenous (i.e., 
given in economie analysis). Expectations were only incorporated implicitly. Substituting Mises's 
relatively static sübjectivism by a more dynamic subjectivism, as Lachmann does, makes Mises's 
conclusion contingent, to say the least. 
The foregoing may be stated differently. As coordination "... refers to the systematic 
exploitation of profit opportunities as they aast in the understanding of market participants" (Selgin 
(1988), p. 38, italics in origbal), it depends on the correctness of action. And if action is correct, 
that is, successfuL expectations must also be correct. Transposed to the market process this 
means that there will be a movement towards coordination if entrepreneurs tend to predict the 
51
 Boehm (1982, p. 51 - 52, note 29, italics in original) tells us that "[i]n discussion 
Rothbard vigorously pointed out that Mises's theories of the market process, the business cycle, 
and inflation virtually bristle with expectations." But as was already pointed out, Boehm does not 
deny this. In fact, he continues by agreeing with Rothbard, although "... this is emphatically not 
the question I wish to address. My contention is rather that Mises's vivid picture of the market 
process could only emerge to the extent that he left his apriorism behind and formulated 
(empirical) hypotheses about the expectations of the actors involved. ... My claim is ... that 
praxeology cannot accommodate expectations in any meaningful way." 
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future circumstances correctly. It then succeeds in fulfilling (1) the entrepreneurs' objectives, and 
(2) the consumers' objectives. This tendency towards the two-sided fulfilment of subjectively 
experienced profit opportunities is not a matter of logic but rather a contingent issue. It depends 
on the entrepreneurial ability to leam and predict expectations about future circumstances 
correctly. No logic guarantees their successfulness, and neither does the process of competition, 
hence the assumption conceming a coordinating tendency is a contingent one. This contingency 
means that there is a task for empirical testing, although it must be added that Neo-Austrian 
economists consider it a rather limited one as compared to the role testing plays in Neoclassical 
economics. The subsequent section will examine this role. 
3.6.4. EMPIRICAL TESTING 
Praxeology must be supplemented by aualiary hypotheses in order to be useful in the explanati-
on of market phenomena. As these auxiliary assumptions are empirical as well as contingent, the 
resulting theories are also contingent. This means that empirical testing must play a role. 
However, Neo-Austrians argue that this role is rather limited. lts limits, Hayek (1967b) argues, 
are caused by the nature of the complex social phenomena (cf. section 35.). This complexity has 
several consequences for economie model building. It is more difficult to find all relevant 
variables in the social sciences than in the physical sciences, in the sense that "... the demarcati-
on line between the physical and the social sciences is defined by the likelihood of specification 
[of the model] error, which is low in the physical and high in the social sciences" (Paqué (1990, 
p. 286)).52 This means that in the social sciences accurate prediction (either forwards or back-
wards) of events will be very difficult. The same applies to the empirical testing of economie 
hypotheses. However, one may make a distinction between instance prediction and pattem 
prediction.5^ The complexity of social events means that we cannot possess all knowledge 
required to predict the occuirence of particular instances of these events. But in Hayek's view 
this does not mean that prediction is impossible. He argues that "[w]e are ... interested not only 
in individual events, and it is also not only predictions of individual events which can be 
empirically tested. We are equally interested in the recurrence in the abstract patterns as such; 
and the prediction that a pattern of a certain kind will appear in defined circumstances is a 
falsifiable (and therefore empirical) statement. ... The circumstances or conditions in which the 
pattern described by the theory will appear are defined by the range of values which may be 
inserted for the variables of the fonnula. All we need to know in order to make such a theory 
As Paqué (1990, p. 287) correctly observes, the inherent lack of consensus conceming the 
'correct' model wül lead economie models to depend heavily on prior methodological commit-
ments. 
53
 'Patterns' can be defined by (sets of) algebraic equations, or in other words, mathemati-
cal models. Individual manifestations (instances) of such patterns (models) are obtained if the 
(exogenous and endogenous) variables are given definite values. Cf. Hayek (1967b, p. 24). A 
pattern prediction then is not a prediction in the usual sense of the word; it merely predicts that 
a certain pattern (model) will emerge in particular circumstances. 
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applicable to a situation is, therefore, that the data possess certain general properties (or belong 
to the class defined by the scope of the variables). Beyond this we need to know nothing about 
their individual attributes so long as we are content to derive merely the sort of pattern that will 
appear and not its particular manifestation" (1967b, p. 28). Hayek subsequently mentions 
Walrasian general equiHbrium theory as an example (p. 36). He argues that "[s]ince the theory 
tells us under which conditions a pattern of this sort will form itself, it will enable us to create 
such conditions and to observe whether a pattern of the kind predicted will appear." He thinks 
that "[sjuch a theory will, ... in Popper's terms, be one of small empirical content, because it 
enables us to predict or explain only certain general features of a situation which may be 
compatible with a great many particular circumstances. ... [I]n any case the range of phenomena 
compatible with it will be wide and the possibility of falsifying it correspondingly small. But as in 
many fields this will be for the present, or perhaps forever, all the theoretical knowledge we can 
achieve, it will nevertheless extend the range of the possible advance of scientific knowledge" 
(Hayek (1967b, pp. 28 - 29)). As Paqué (1990, pp. 290 - 91) shows, it seems that Hayek 
believed that the pattern prediction of general equilibrium theory could (at least in principle) be 
refuted, although we are ignorant of the particular circumstances of all agents in any model 
economy. However, he argues that it is more correct to interpret any model as a framework of 
thinking, which by itself does not yield any falsifiable pattern prediction. As Paqué (1990, p. 291) 
stated, the model "... serves as a ground for developing singular hypotheses which are themselves 
perfectly falsifiable, since their parametric structure allows for genuine predictions of - in 
Hayek's terms - particular events, not patterns. In this sense a nonfalsifiable framework of 
thinking, such as general equilibrium theory, has clearly much empirical content as long as it is 
a rich pool for deriving [new] testable hypotheses." Paqué (1990, p. 292 - 93) concludes that 
Hayek must be interpreted as saying that (1) economie model building is much more complica-
ted than in the physical sciences because of the complexity of the phenomena involved; (2) 
econometrie testing is subject to more constraints and cannot achieve as much as testing in the 
physical sciences; and (3) economists should not expect economie theories to deliver precise 
forecasts which could serve as a solid basis for guiding policy decisions. 
Lachmann (1977, pp. 57 - 58) also expresses his doubt as to the usefulness and 
meaningfulness of empirical testing in the social sciences when stating that "[s]cientific tests are 
not available to us since they require a complete description of that concrete 'starting point' in 
which the test is to take place. Every human action, however, depends on the state of knowledge 
of the actors. A verification [or rather falsification] test therefore would require an exhaustive 
description of the state of knowledge of all actors, also according to the mode of distribution -
an obvious impossibility. Otherwise, however, the starting point is not exactly defined, and no 
real test is possible." If the starting point of any test is not exactly defined in case our hypothesis 
is not corroborated, we cannot know then whether this must be attributed to the incorrectness 
of the hypothesis or to some omitted (or incorrectly specified) initial condition. The 'discorrobo-
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ration' of the hypothesis then does not provide us with any insight concerning its 'truth'.54 
Another difficulty as regards empirical testing concerns the problem that the method 
of Versteken may not be applicable in the same degree to the future as it is to the past, as 
Lachmann (1977, pp. 93 - 94) observed. Therefore, he discerns a forward- and a backward-
looking aspect of the study of human actions. The former looks at the plans of the individuals 
and asks whether these plans are consistent with one another. If not, the outcome of actions will 
prove different than the intended and expected outcomes. This will lead to a change in actions 
and/or plans. However, the social scientist cannot know in which direction this change will take 
place, because it will depend on the knowledge and the subjective valuations of the agents, 
which are only known to the agents themselves. Furthermore, as future actions are based on 
future constellations of plans, and hence future knowledge, they cannot be known at all. The 
backward-looking aspect, on the other hand, reverses this procedure and asks what historical 
constellation of plans has given rise to an existing situation. It rationally reconstructs (or 
interprets) the decision situations which faced the agents. Lachmann defines the method of 
Versteken as the backward-looking method of interpretation, thereby acknowledging the limited 
applicability of the method with regard to future actions. 
In conclusion, Hayek and Lachmann (as main representatives of the revisionists) argue 
that although there is a role for testing in economics, in practice it is rather limited because of 
the dispersion of knowledge and the complexity of social phenomena. Additionally, such testing 
can only be carried out retrospectively, because of the logical impossibility of knowing our future 
knowledge. In contrast, dogmadsts such as Mises and Rothbard adhere to the view that their 
economic theories are universally valid and empirically meaningful, because they can be derived 
from the action axiom. Testing is then superfluous. Both Neo-Austrian currents thus take rather 
extreme positions as regards the meaningfulness and feasibility of the empirical testing of their 
hypotheses. If testing and, more in particular, prediction are to a large degree senseless 
activities, the question emerges what goals Neo-Austrian economics tries to attain. 
3.7. THE GOALS OF NEO-AUSTRIAN ECONOMICS 
The Neo-Austrian position on this topic has been most explicitly stated by Hayek and Lach-
mann. The former stated in 1964 (pp. 91 - 92) that the main conclusion of his 1937 article 
'Economics and Knowledge' was that "... the task of economie theory was to explain how an 
overall order of economie activity was achieved which utilizes a large amount of knowledge 
Cf. also Snippe (1986, pp. 14 - 15): "[i]f there is no possibility to test our predictions, 
there will be no rational procedure for deciding between rival predictions, which would leave us 
with no safeguards to sheer quackery. ... jTjf the dispersion of knowledge does not allow us to 
know the particular data, we cannot rationally decide whether an inconsistency between the 
negative implications of some pattem prediction with experience is due to a change in these 
data, or caused by the inadequacy of the pattern prediction involved." 
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which was not concentrated in any one mind but existed only as the separate knowledge of 
thousands or millions of different individuals". Lachmann (1973, p. 204) stresses the constituent 
elements of such an order when claiming that "[e]conomics has two tasks. The first is to make 
the world around us intelligible in terms of human action and the pursuit of plans. The second 
is to tracé the unintended consequences of such action." Fulfilment of the underlying plan is the 
intended consequence of action. However, in trying to achieve their goals individuals aeate an 
'overall order of economie actmty\ This order is not intended by them; it is the unintended 
consequence of their actions. 
Praxeology (and more in particular economics) investigates rational human action. It 
isolates the element of volition, which cannot be explained by physics, physiology, or psychology. 
It tries to explain the world around us in terms of human motives. Kirzner (1976, pp. 44-45) 
interprets Lachmann (1973) in the following way: "... I take it that he was telling us the 
following: It is the task of science to describe and explain reality. If reality consists of more tfaan 
the external world, then a science that is confined to the facts of the extemal world is simply 
incomplete. It does not account for everything that is there. ... What is that something else? It is 
the ... realm of purposes. ... It is there, and if we fail to point it out, then we fail in the task of 
making the world intelligible in terms of human action." He combines Lachmann's two tasks of 
economics with two basic insights: "First, there is the insight that human action is purposeful, 
and, second, there is the insight that there is an indeterminacy and unpredictability inherent in 
human preferences, human expectations, and human knowledge" (Kirzner (1976), p. 42). As he 
subsequently points out, the first insight is sufficiënt to sustain the first task of economics, that 
is, making the world around us intelligible in terms of human action. But the second insight 
seems to be inconsistent with the requirement (or task of economics) that economie explanations 
should tracé the unintended consequences of human actions. Although it may be possible to 
tracé these consequences ex post, it will be quite impossible to find out ex ante what the 
T intentions of individual agents are if human preferences, human expectations, and human 
knowledge are indeterminate and unpredictable (cf. Hayek's notion of the dispersion of 
knowledge). If we cannot know the content of human preferences, human knowledge and human 
expectations, we cannot know the plan (i.e., the intended consequences) upon which human 
actions are based. This means that we cannot know the outcome of the actions. Predictions of 
the unintended outcomes of human action are then merely wild guesses. Hayek's methodological 
prescription that economics must formulate falsifiable predictions or make pattern predictions 
becomes untenable. As Kirzner (1976, p. 50) concluded, "... while one of these basic tenets, that 
of human purposefulness, is sufficiënt to sustain one of these two requirements (that of making 
the world intelligible in terms of human action), the second, which asserts the unpredictability of 
human knowledge, is inconsistent with the requirement that economie explanations tracé the 
unintended consequences of human action." This conclusion was already reached in the previous 
section. In Neo-Austrian economics it is senseless to predict. lts objectives must be confined to 
explaining past human behaviour in terms of rational human action. This means that retrodiction 
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remains possible. Kirzner's conclusion is then too stringent: Neo-Austrians can formulate 
falsifiable hypotheses, in the sense that their retrodictions are contingent. 
3.8. MODERN DEVELOPMENTS IN NEO-AUSTRIAN METHODOLOGY 
The upsurge in the number of Neo-Austrian (or Neo-Austrian-affiliated) economists is bound to 
lead to more controversies within this school of thought. After all, the more researchers, the 
more opinions. These differences will also concern methodological issues.55 Many Neo-Austrians 
today no longer adhere to extreme aprioristic claims of the dogmatic current and therefore 
render Neo-Austrian theory less vulnerable to criticism of its logica! foundations. But at the 
same time, this will give rise to disagreemect on this fundamental issue within Austrianism. 
One of the most important revisions of Neo-Austrian methodology has been its 
rationa! reconstruction along the lines of Imre Lakatos's Methodology of Scientific Research 
Programmes (MSRP), as carried out by Rizzo (1982) and Langlois (1982). Rizzo and Langlois 
both stress that rational reconstruction does not aim at describing a body of theories as ex-
pounded by its originators. It tries to construct an ex post consistent representation of that body 
of theories. It even involves departing from the original meaning of the ideas where they are (or 
seem to be) inconsistent with the central insights of the theoretical system. More importantly, 
rational reconstructions of the Neo-Austrian theoretical system in terms of Lakatos's MSRP 
deviate in a more or less serious way from the fundamental epistemological views of the 
praxeologists.56 
The epistemological inconsistency between apriorism and the MSRP leads to the 
question whether it is admissible to represent Neo-Austrianism in terms of the MSRP. After all, 
Lakatos tried to provide a framework in which sequences of theories could be appraised with 
respect to their 'progressiveness'. It seems hardly justifiable to appraise apriorism by using the 
criteria of the MSRP, as they stand in different epistemological traditions. In section 4 it will be 
argued that the MSRP can be useful without adopting its epistemology. We shall argue that it 
can be used as a framework in which we can describe the methodology of the Neo-Austrian 
55
 Cf. Walter Block's (1980) defense of extreme rationalism, Rizzo's (1982) and Langlois's 
(1982) attempts for a rational reconstruction of the Austrian 'style of thought' along Lakatosian 
lines, and White's (1984) study of Austrian methodology. 
56
 According to Rizzo (1982, p. 55), "[t]he theoretical hard core of a research program 
consists of one or more statements that are rendered irrefutable by the methodological decision 
of the scientists working within the program." Langlois (1982, p. 76) points out that Mises would 
not agree that the core of economics is a matter of methodological choice: "... Mises was what 
Lakatos would likely have described as a classical Kantian justificationist rationalist. His position 
is Kantian in that he seeks to derive theory from the very logic of the brain's categorical 
structure; it is classical rationalist in that he sees truth as easily accessible to the rational mind 
once the delusive epiphenomena of empirical sense-data are swept away, and it is justificationist 
in that he holds up his a priori methodology not merely as a good starting point for theory but 
actually as justifying theory - as proving its correctness." 
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school of thought, provided that such a description is supplemented by some epistemologjcal 
considerations. 
3.9. CONCLUSIONS 
Neo-Austrians differ in their positions concerning the logical foundation of the axiom of human 
action. Whereas Neo-Austrians such as Mises and Rothbard adhere to the view that this axiom 
is universaüy valid as well as empirically meaningfiü, Hayek and T-arhmann disagree with this by 
claiming that the axiom is tautological and thus empirically meaningless. This does not mean 
that the axiom is cognitively insignificant. It merely claims that it is universaüy valid by 
definition. Obviously, this difference in logical foundation leads to differing positions concerning 
the need to empirically test the theories which have been derived deductively from the action 
axiom. Whereas Mises and Rothbard argue that praxeological theories are true and need not be 
tested (although their own theoretical conclusions as regards the tendency towards coordination 
are not derived using only a priori propositions), Hayek and Lachmann claim that praxeology 
cannot but lead to tautological statements. They argue that praxeology must be supplemented 
with empirical hypotheses concerning the individuals' knowledge acquisition and expectations 
formation processes in order to render it empirically meaningful. However, at the same time 
they hold that in practice testing will be extremely difficult because of the complex phenomena 
involved. Selgin agrees with the lhnited (or even nonexistent) possibilites of empirical testing of 
praxeology by referring to the subjective nature of people's valuations of profit and loss. As 
these are immeasurable, empirical testing of whether psychic proSts more than offset psychic 
losses becomes meaningless. However, the same then applies to the notion of coordination. If 
we cannot determine whether more profit opportunities have been seized than have been created 
(or, more correctly, if we do not know whether psychic profits have been larger than psychic 
losses), then we cannot know whether a tendency towards coordination bas taken place: all we 
know is that individuals do what they do because they think it is the best way to fulfil their 
plans. We cannot know whether there is a tendency for them to be successful. This means that 
"... characterizing the market as a strictly equilibrating process is an incomplete and misleading 
way of describing and analyzing the market process. It leaves unexplained those changes in 
tastes, technology, and resources that upset previously compatible plans. These changes are the 
result of entrepreneurship and are as endogenous to the market as any other entrepreneurial 
change" (High (1986), p. 118). The market must be seen as a social order which may or may 
not lead to coordination, depending on the individuals' learning and expectations formation 
functions. Then the claim that such a tendency exists is an empirical one, which means that it is 
in principle amenable to testing. 
Prediction then cannot be the goal of Neo-Austrian economics. But retrodiction is 
feasible, in the sense that Neo-Austrians can make past social phenomena intelligible in terms of 
rationa! human action. They try to accomplish this while adhering to four major methodological 
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tenets: (1) methodological individualism, (2) radical subjectivism, (3) methodological singularism, 
and (4) methodological dualism. 
4. LAKATOS'S METHODOLOGY OF SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH 
PROGRAMMES AS A DESCRIPTIVE FRAMEWORK 
4.1. INTRODUCnON 
The description of Neo-Austrian methodology given in the previous section is not an end in 
itself. It is a part of a comparison between Neo-Austrian and New Classical views. This means 
that it should be presented in a way which facilitates this comparison. The question then is 
which presentation is most suited. Comparing the methodological views of schools of thought 
presupposes some common denominators in which these views can be expressed. This means 
that one must find a framework in which one can describe the respective views on methodology. 
It will have the common denominators as its elements, which should be as explicit as possible. 
Furthermore, the type of framework will depend on the type of comparison to be conducted. 
Neo-Austrians and New Classicals differ in their views concerning economie theory, 
methodology and epistemology. As we saw in section 2, the Neo-Austrian school can be 
subdivided into two currents, namely a dogmatic and a revisionist one. The main criterion for 
this subdivision is the difference in their respective views on the logical foundation of the action 
axiom. Nevertheless, this epistemological disagreement does not prevent both currents from 
adhering to more or less the same methodology, even as regards the role of empirical testing of 
economie hypotheses. Both argue that such testing is either redundant or almost impossible for 
all practical purposes. By contrast, New Classicals strongly emphasize the need for prediction 
and empirical testing. This may be traced to their epistemological views.58 As the question which 
epistemology should be accepted, has not been resolved unequivocally, we cannot determine 
which view is true. This means that we cannot judge the Neo-Austrian view by New Classical 
standards, and vice versa. Therefore, the framework in which both methodologies will be 
compared should take the epistemological differences into account. 
'Prediction' is used in the same sense as Lakatos (1970, p. 116, note 4), that is, including 
'postdiction' (or 'retrodiction'). 
58
 These views will be described in another chapter. For the moment we shall take it for 
granted that New Classicals adopt the logical-positivist view that propositions are either analytic 
and a priori, or synthetic and a posteriori. Furthermore, it may be argued on good grounds that 
New Classicals are instrumentalists, in the sense that they think that economics as a social 
science must design models which can be used as instruments for policy evaluation (cf. Lucas 
(1981, p. 271) and (1988, p. 35)). Not surprisingly, this will lead to an emphasis on the role of 
empirical testing. It will also have an impact on their other methodological characteristics. 
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The framework which is chosen in this paper is made up of two parts. The first is an 
epistemological account of Neo-Austrian apriorism and New Classical empiricism (in a broad 
sense), and the second is a description of the respective methodologies in terms of Lakatos's 
Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes (MSRP). Lakatos's aun to appraise research 
programmes may seem to be inconsistent with (1) our intention to give a static (or perhaps 
structuralist) comparison of two methodologies, and (2) the requirement to take account of 
epistemological differences. This section is intended to explain how these inconsistencies can be 
resolved (or circumvented) by restricting the aims of the MSRP. lts role will be limited, in the 
sense that it will be used merely to describe the respective methodologies, and not to appraise 
them. After all, one of the major advantages of the MSRP is its explicitness as regards the 
elements of scientific research programmes. And this explicitness obviously facilitates the 
comparison to be made. 
This section is organized as follows. Firstly, it will give a short account of the aims of 
the MSRP, as intended by Lakatos himself. It will depict the MSRP as an attempt to solve 
Popper's eliminaüon problem (section 42.). Given the concept of the scientific research 
programme (SRP), we subsequently turn towards Lakatos's solution of this problem (section 
43.). This solution has received several criticisms, some of which will be discussed in section 4.4. 
After this discussion of Lakatos's theory, we shall direct our attention to the ways in which the 
MSRP may be used in comparing the schools of thought under consideration. We shall start 
with an analysis of the incorporation of epistemological differences (section 4.5.). This will result 
in the replacement of the aim of appraising theories by the aim of 'merely1 describing them. 
Furthermore, research programmes can be described statically or dynamically. This will depend 
on the aim which is to be achieved. We shall also point out why we use the former method. 
Finally, section 4.6. contains the main conclusions and some final remarks. 
4.2. FROM POPPER TO LAKATOS 
Twentieth-century philosophy of science is very much dominated by the logical positivists and 
critical rationalists. In particular, Popper's falsificationism (which he himself called critical 
rationalism) seems to have swept away its rivals. These days many economists are heavily 
influenced by his ideas, although it may be argued that in many instances this influence is 
confined to their rhetoric 
One of the most prominent features of Popper's thought has been his criterion of 
demarcation.60 In his view, verification cannot lead to universally valid and empirically meaning-
ful knowledge because of Hume's Problem of Induction. However, falsification can teil us 
Cf. McCloskey (1985). 
Cf. Popper (1959 (1990), section 6, pp. 40 - 42). 
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whether a proposition is not universally valid.61 Empirical testing of propositions is then very 
important for the derivation of universally valid knowledge. If applied dogmatically, methodologi-
cal falsificationism advises to reject theories which are falsified, thus leading to a body of 
falsified and refuted theories of which we know for certain that they are not universally valid. 
However, as Kuhn (1962) and Lakatos (1970) observed, nearly all scientific theories can be 
confronted with anomalies. Dogmatic falsificationism would lead to the elimination of all these 
theories. This is not an acceptable option, because it would be a rather naive methodological 
advice (hence the term naive falsificationism). In scientific reality theories are not eliminated 
only because of a few anomalies. Falsified theories may be adjusted with the help of auxiliary 
hypotheses. Popper (1963 (1989), p. 37) himself already acknowledged that such adjustment can 
be carried out by what he called conventionalist stratagems. These "... rescue the theory from 
refutation only at the price of destroying, or at least lowering, its scientific status." However, if 
such adjustment need not stop theories from being scientific, then the question arises when 
falsified theories must be eliminated. This problem will be called Popper's elimination problem. 
Kuhn (1962) provided a sociological or socio-psychological solution to this problem, in 
the sense that he ascribed a prominent role to tradition. Tradition is seen as one of the most 
important factors preventing the elimination of a falsified theory. Under normal circumstances, 
that is, in a time of great consensus, almost all scientists engage in research using more or less 
the same methods. In Kuhn's terminology they work in the same paradigm, namely that of 
normal science, which is defined as "... research firmly based upon one or more past scientific 
achievements, achievements that some particular scientific community acknowledges for a time as 
supplying the foundation for its further practice" (1962 (1970), p. 10). However, in case the 
number of anomalies continues to grow even tradition cannot avoid the crisis of confidence. This 
crisis may lead to an overthrow of the existing and predominant method of research, constituting 
a scientific revolution. Such a revolution can be seen as a Gestaltswitch. Suddenly the same 
ff) 
phenomena are interpreted differently. the interpretational framework has changed. 
Lakatos agreed with Kuhn that naive falsificationism is indeed falsified when applied in 
the history of science. But this does not mean that we must dispense with the criterion of 
falsifiability, as Kuhn's analysis seemed to imply. Lakatos offered two criticisms. Firstly, he 
argued that Kuhn's distinction between normal science and revolutionary science fails to do 
justice to the history of science being a history of competition (1970, p. 155). In Lakatos's view 
normal science should not be and is not without competition from rival paradigms. These rivals 
exist side by side. One could merely uphold that at some point in time a specific paradigm, or, 
in Lakatos's terminology, research programme, predicted more novel facts than another, and 
This does not mean that our theories are always false. Those which have not been 
falsified may be true. Popper merely holds that even if some theories are true, we cannot know 
this for certain. 
Cf. Kuhn (1962 (1970), pp. 122 - 23). 
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hence dominated others. Interpreted this way one could argue that Lakatos falsified Kuhn's 
theory. It provides Kuhn's theoty with an anomaly. However, this does not suffïce to refute 
Kuhn's theory because such refutation would imply the acceptance of naive falsificationism. 
Secondly, the Kuhnian sodological or sodo-psychological64 explanation does not give any 
objective criteria for eliminating the paradigm of normal sdence (Lakatos, (1970), p. 155). It 
depends on the sdentists' intellectual honesty whether they turn their back to normal sdence 
and produce a sdentific revolution. Sdence is not a rational activity anymore, in the sense that it 
allows sdentists to have other goals than attaining 'truth'. 
Rejecting naive falsificationism, Lakatos could not claim that Kuhn's theory should be 
refuted because it was confronted with an anomaly. He was in need of spedfying a criterion 
which tells us when to eliminate a theory. Thus, Lakatos had to provide a solution to Popper's 
elimination problem other than the naive falsificationist one in order to reject Kuhn's solution. 
4.3. LAKATOS'S SOLUTION OF POPPER'S EUMINATION PROBLEM 
Lakatos (1970) distinguished between dogmatic or naive methodological falsificationism (as 
expounded in section 42.) and sophisticated methodological falsificationism. He argued that 
"[s]ophisticated falsificationism differs from naive falsificationism both in its rules of acceptance 
(or 'demarcation criterion') and its rules of falsification or elimination" (p. 116, italics in 
original). The naive falsificationist is defined as holding the position that "... any theory which 
can be interpreted as experimentally falsifiable, is 'acceptable' or 'sdentific'. For the sophisticated 
falsificationist a theory is 'acceptable' or 'sdentific' only if it has corroborated excess empirical 
content over its predecessor (or, rival), that is, only if it leads to the discovery of novel facts" (p. 
116). A theory which leads to the prediction of novel facts is called empiricalfy progressive, 
otherwise it is degenerating. Lakatos now solves the elimination problem in the following way. He 
argues that there are only relative and no absolute standards against which to appraise theories. 
They must be compared with one another in order to dedde which one is the best. "Contrary to 
naive falsificationism, ... [sophisticated falsificationism holds that] no experiment, experimental 
report, observation statement or well-corroborated low-level falsifying hypothesis alone can lead to 
falsification. There is no falsification before the emergence of a better theory" (Lakatos (1970), p. 
119, italics in original). This means that "[w]hile naive falsificationism stresses 'the urgency of 
repladng a falsified hypothesis by a better one', sophisticated falsificationism stresses the urgency 
of repladng any hypothesis by a better one" (Lakatos (1970, p. 122, italics in original). This view 
Kuhn (1962, p. 4) notes that "... the early developmental stages of most sdences have 
been characterized by continual competition between a number of distinct views of nature, each 
partially derived from , and all roughly compatible with, the dictates of sdentific observation and 
method." He seems to imply that this competition does not exist anymore. 
Kuhn (1970, p. 240) himself preferred 'sodology* instead of 'sodo-psychology'. 
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is consistent with scientifïc practice that theories are not eliminated once an anomaly is 
discovered, but only if a better alternative is available.0 According to Lakatos (1970, p. 116) 
there are three preconditions which must be fulfilled before a theory Tt must be eliminated, 
namely: 
(1) there is a better theory T2, which predicts or explains all facts which are predicted or 
explained by Tv that is, T2 encompasses Tjj 
(2) T2 has excess empincal content over Tx: it leads to the prediction of novel (not new) facts; 
(3) some of the novel facts predicted by T2 are corroborated by empirical tests. 
In fact, Lakatos argues that scientists must meet the requirement of continuous growth, i.e., of 
continuous empirical progressiveness. Furthermore, they are well-advised to eliminate a theory if 
there is a better alternative, in the sense as described above. Lakatos's elimination procedure 
thus involves a comparison and appraisal of rival theories. Moreover, given the requirement that 
there must be scientific growth, these theories form a sequence. Such a sequence is called a 
scientific research programme, which constitutes Lakatos's unit of appraisal 
Research programmes (SRPs) consist of methodological rules, which teil scientists how 
to carry out their research, what paths of research to avoid, and what paths to pursue (Lakatos 
(1970, p. 132)). SRPs can be divided into four clements, namely the hard core, the protective 
belt, the positive heuristic and the negative heuristic. 
The hard core forms the characterization of the SRP. It consists of a set of postulates 
which cannot be refuted without changing the programme dramatically, or better, without 
changing from one programme to another. These postulates are protected from anomalies by 
means of the articulation of a set of 'auxiliary hypotheses', which form the protective belt around 
the hard core. Any anomaly must be dealt with by changing one or more of these auxiliary 
hypotheses. The question then arises how the revision of the protective belt should take place. 
The positive heuristic contains a set of rules according to which the belt must be changed in 
order to 'explain' anomalies. It "... consists of a partially articulated set of suggestions or hints 
on how to change, develop the 'refutable variants' of the research-programme, how to modify, 
sophisticate, the 'refutable' protective belt. ... The positive heuristic sets out a programme which 
lists a chain of ever more complicated models simulating reality: the scientist's attention is 
riveted on building his models following instructions which are laid down in the positive part of 
his programme" (Lakatos (1970), p. 135, italics in original). Analogously, the negative heuristic 
tells the scientist how he must not proceed when dealing with anomalies. It "... forbids us to 
For instance, see De Marchi (1976) on the economists' reactions to the Leontief paradox. 
66
 It should be noted that Lakatos allows for a change of hard core without this being a 
change in research programme. After some time parts of die protective belt may be incorpora-
ted into the hard core. However, this obscures the differences between changes within and 
changes between research programmes. Moreover, for our purposes it suffices to consider the 
hard core as the part of a research programme, which does not change at all. 
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direct the modus tollens at [the] 'hard core'. Instead, we must use our ingenuity to articulate or 
even invent 'auxiliary hypotheses', which form a protective belt around this core, and we must 
redirect the modus tollens to fhesé" (Lakatos (1970), p. 133, italics in original).67 Hard core and 
negative heuristic are thus closely linked, as are protective belt and positive heuristic. 
The question may now be addressed when to eliminate a given research programme. 
Lakatos's solution to this elimination problem is analogous to the solution as regards the 
elimination of theories. In other words, a given research programmes can be substituted by a 
rival programme, if three criteria are met. Firstly, a programme R1 can only be eliminated if 
there is a rival R2, which encompasses Rv Secondly, R2 must predict or explain novel facts. And 
thirdly, some of these facts must be corroborated, that is, R2 must have excess empirical content 
over R r As the elimination procedure thus involves the appraisal of rival programmes, and 
hence the progressiveness of successive theories, "[sjophisticated falsificationism ... shifts the 
problem of how to appraise theories to the problem of how to appraise series of theories. Not an 
isolated theory, but only a series of theories [that is, a research programme] can be said to be 
scientific or unscienüfic: to apply the term 'scientific' to one single theory is a category mistake" 
(Lakatos (1970), p. 119). 
In sum, Lakatos holds that a science must meet the requirement of continuous growth, 
which means that theories and research programmes must only be eliminated if there is a better 
rival theory or research programme. In order to be able to determine whether continuous 
growth has taken place, research programmes must be compared and appraised on their 
progressiveness. 
4.4. SOME CRITiaSMS OF THE MSRP 
The MSRP is thus intended to appraise SRPs on their progressiveness. However, rival program-
mes need not predict a novel fact at once. Some time may pass before they become empirically 
progressive. As Lakatos (1970, p. 155, italics in original) puts it, "... the novelty of a factual 
proposition can frequenüy be seen onfy after a long period has elapsed.' This means that it is very 
difficult to assess whether a rival programme is progressive. 
A related criticism has been put forward by Kuhn (1970b) and Feyerabend (1970, 
1976). Both argue that Lakatos's solution of the elimination problem is too weak to enable us to 
Two important types of logical argument are the modus ponens and the modus tollens. 
The former has the following form: (1) If p, then q; (2) p; (3) hence q. The modus tollens takes 
this form: (1) If p, then q; (2) -q (Le., not q); (3) hence -p. For instance, suppose p = 'It rains', 
and q = The roofs get wet'. Then the modus ponens is: (1) 'If it rains, then the roofs get wet' 
(given the sufficiënt boundary conditions); (2) Tt rains'; (3) hence The roofs get wet'. Converse-
ly, the modus tollens in this case is: (1) 'If it rains, then the roofs get wet'; (2) The roofs do 
not get wet'; (3) hence Tt does not rain'. Directing the modus tollens to the protective belt then 
means that it must be reformulated if the theoretical condusions (q) are not corroborated by 
the facts. 
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condemn actions as 'irrational'. Lakatos (1970, p. 164) noted that "... research programmes may 
get out of degenerating troughs." But this raises a problem concerning the rationality of adhering 
to a degenerating programme. If degenerating programmes may become progressive again, then 
adherence to such programmes cannot be condemned as 'irrational' or 'intellectually dishonest'. 
According to both Kuhn and Feyerabend, this means that Lakatos's solution to the elimination 
problem is not really a solution. It allows scientists either to eliminate degenerating programmes 
or to adhere to them. In other words, it allows that 'anything goes'. This leads Kuhn (1970b, p. 
239, italics in original) to conclude that "... Lakatos has yet to teil us how scientists are to select 
the particular statements that are to be unfalsifiable by their fiat; he must also still specify 
criteria which can be used at the time to distinguish a degenerative from a progressive research 
programme." And as Lakatos does not specify a time limit, Feyerabend (1970, p. 215) holds that 
progress and degeneration are merely 'verbal ornaments', which do not form criteria for 
acceptance or rejection of theories and research programmes. Instead, they are assigned to 
theories or programmes which have already been accepted or rejected. This means that theory-
choice is not a rational activity, in the sense that it does not aim at reaching 'truth'. However, 
Lakatos (1971, p. 116 - 17, Note, italics in original) defends his position by arguing that these 
criticisms "... are beside the point. One may rationally stick to a degenerating programme until it 
is overtaken by a rival and even after. What one must not do is to deny its poor public record. 
Both Feyerabend and Kuhn conflate methodological appraisal of a programme with firm heuristic 
advice about what to do."68 The methodological conclusion that a particular programme is 
degenerating and that it is overtaken by a rival, does not imply that one must eliminate the 
programme.69 However, intellectual honesty (rationality) demands that the poor performance is 
not denied. 
A third objection against Lakatos's methodology concerns the communication between 
scientists. Koningsveld (1987, p. 197) argues that Kuhn emphasized the communicative break-
down, while Lakatos neglected this aspect. Of course, this is not to say that such communicative 
breakdowns cannot be incorporated, or at least explained, in Lakatos's framework. Scientists 
belonging to different research programmes will suffer some communicative difficulties because 
their theoretical hard cores differ. It may take some time before this difference is acknowledged. 
It seems, therefore, that the communicative breakdown can be incorporated in Lakatos's analysis 
without much difficulty. 
And he adds that "[i]t is perfectly rational to piay a risky game: what is irrational is to 
deceive oneself about the risk." 
69
 Using an analogy of Watkins, Lakatos (1971, p. 103, note 1) observes that "[tjhe term 
'normative' [in normative methodology] no longer means rules for arriving at solutions, but 
merely directions for the appraisal of solutions already there. Thus methodology is separated 
from heuristics, rather as value judgments are from 'ought' statements." 
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4.5. THE MSRP AS FRAMEWORK OF DESCRIPTION 
The criticisms listed in the previous section lead to the conclusion that Lakatos was not 
completely successful in solving Popper's elimination problem. It might be added that there is 
another criticism, which renders the MSRP as intended by Lakatos somewhat troublesome, at 
least for our purposes. This point concerns its underlying epistemology. Without going into too 
much detail, it will be clear that accepting Lakatos's methodology as a means of appraising 
research programmes implies that one accepts his epistemology. This epistemology holds that 
propositions are either analytic and a priori, or synthetic and a posteriori. In this sense it can be 
said to be a sophisticated version of Popperian critical rationalism. The acceptance of this 
epistemology poses an important problem if the MSRP is to be used for appraising research 
programmes which are based on different epistemologies. For instance, if we must appraise Neo-
Austrian apriorism in terms of critical rationalism, we would observe that the dogmatic current 
adheres to a different epistemology than Popper and Lakatos. Their interpretation of the action 
axiom as either a synthetic a priori proposition or a self-evident a posteriori proposition would 
have to be rejected because critical rationalism does not allow for these types of propositions. 
The appraisal of the views of the dogmatic-aprioristic current will then lead to the conclusion 
that it is based on an incorrect epistemology. However, this presupposes that critical-rationalistic 
epistemology is true. This truth is difficult to establish, even on the account of critical rationa-
lism itself. And if its truth cannot be established, this epistemology will not do as a Standard 
of appraisal. Therefore, it seems that the MSRP cannot be used to appraise the Neo-Austrian 
research programme. Of course, this is not to say that it is completely useless for our purposes. 
Although it cannot be employed for purposes of appraisal in case of research programmes which 
are based on different epistemologies, it may serve as a framework for description, that is, as a 
scheme which explicates the respective (changes in the) structure of Neo-Austrian and New 
Classical research programmes. The question then is on which aspects this description should 
concentrate. 
There are two ways in which we can describe and compare research programmes. 
Firstly, we can describe their constituting elements by explicating their hard core, protective belt, 
positive heuristic and negative heuristic, and then comparing the contents of these elements. This 
type will be called a static description. Secondly, we can give a historiographical account of how 
these programmes emerged and how they changed. This will be called a dynamic description. In 
our case we are not concerned with changes in the respective research programmes. Rather, the 
aim is to describe the structure of the theories under consideration. It will be confined to the 
hard core, the protective belt, the positive heuristic and the negative heuristic of the respective 
programmes. The comparison of the structures may lead to some useful insights as regards (1) 
The sentence There are no synthetic a priori propositions' must also be considered a 
conjecture, whose truth we cannot establish. 
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the goals which the programmes try to attain, (2) the possible ways in which theoretical insights 
of the one may help to solve theoretical problems of the other, and (3) the limitations posed on 
the problems which can be analyzed by either programme. 
4.6. CONCLUSIONS 
This section has explained Lakatos's methodology of scientific research programmes, which can 
be seen as an attempt to solve Popper's elimination problem. Lakatos substituted naive 
falsifïcationism by sophisticated falsificationism. This means that mere falsification does not 
suffice as a demarcation criterion. There must also be a rival theory or research programme 
which is better than the one which is to be rejected. Lakatos's methodology resulted in the 
position that scientists must aim at the continuous growth of knowledge. This means that they 
must work in empirically progressive theories and research programmes. However, scientists 
were also allowed to adhere to degenerating programmes because these may become progressive 
again. Thus, the MSRP does not provide an unambiguous solution to the elimination problem. 
Moreover, the MSRP does not allow for an appraisal of research programmes which 
are based on different epistemologies than its own critical rationalism. Thus, it does not provide 
an objective Standard for appraisal. Nevertheless, it gives an explicit framework in which research 
programmes can be described, although such a description must be supplemented by a 
description of the respective epistemological views. 
The type of description depends on the problem with which it is concerned. In this 
study we are interested in the respective structures of the Neo-Austrian and New Classical 
research programmes, and not in the changes in these structures. Our description will therefore 
be a static one. The Neo-Austrian research programme will be described in the next section. 
5. THE NEO-AUSTRIAN RESEARCH PROGRAMME 
5.1. INTRODUCnON 
Given the limitations discussed in the previous section, we can now try to translate Austrian 
methodology in terms of Lakatos's MSRP. This will be done with reference to two earlier 
attempts, namely those of Rizzo (1982) and Langlois (1982) (cf. also section 3.8). It must be 
noted that these studies do not intend merely to describe the Austrian methodology in these 
terms. Instead, they are rational reconstructions, which means that they also aim at making it 
internally consistent. Furthermore, both authors are willing to abandon apriorism, which makes 
them clearly 'revisionists'. This position leads to an epistemological schism between the 
aprioristic-dogmatic current and the revisionist-empiricist one. In particular, this schism concerns 
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the logica! foundation of the action axiom and hence the role of empirical testing. 
This section is organized as follows. Section 5.2. articulates Langlois's 'hard core'. As 
he did not explicate some propositions which may prove rather important when comparing Neo-
Austrian and New Classical methodology, we shall attempt to make these propositions explicit. 
Section 53. describes the Austrian 'protective belt', that is, the set of propositions which protect 
the hard core from anomalies (or even refutation). The 'positive heuristic', i.e., the set of rules 
which Neo-Austrians think social scientists should follow when doing research, is depicted in 
section 5.4., foliowed by an account of the 'negative heuristic' in section 5.5. Neo-Austrians are 
very much concerned with the question how research should not be carried out. This means that 
the negative heuristic is rather extensive. We shall restrict our discussion to the Neo-Austrian 
position as regards (1) mathematics, (2) econometrics, and (3) statistics and index numbers. 
5.2. THE HARD CORE 
Rizzo (1982) and Langlois (1982) described Austrian methodology in tenns of the MSRP. Rizzo 
argued that its hard core consists of the following f our hypotheses: 
(1) individuals perceive a decision-making environment; 
(2) perceptions take place in a world of uncertainty, 
(3) individuals' perceptions are not always correct; 
(4) action is coordinating. 
This exposition, despite its merits, has been criticized by Langlois (1982). His criticism centered 
71 
on the aspect of situaüonal determinism, which refers to an outcome of the individual's choice. 
If that individual is in a given situation (including his knowledge), optimizing behaviour may lead 
to only one possible outcome: the individual is in a single-adt decision situation. Analogously, if 
several optimal points are possible, he is in a multiple-exit decision situation ('exit' thus meaning 
'optimal solution'). The decision then cannot be explained completely in tenns of the logic of 
the individual's situation. Rizzo had left out this important aspect, which means that it is not 
clear whether in his formulation of the MSRP individuals can make one or more optimal 
decisions. By contrast, Langlois (1982, p. 79 - 80) maintains that the aspect of situaüonal 
determinism is presumably the most Misesian of all. Latsis (1976, pp. 16 - 22)) gives a rather 
elaborate discussion of situaüonal determinism in neoclassical economics, in which he argued 
that the pure logic of choice is situationally deterministic, in the sense that individuals are in 
single-exit decision situations. This means that economie situations (including given preferences) 
uniquely determine the individuals' decisions and that economists need not seek refuge in 
(social-)psychological or emotional explanations of choices. Langlois (1982) adopts two situatio-
For an analysis of situaüonal determinism, single-exit and multiple-exit decision situation, 
see Latsis (1976, pp. 16 - 22). Hempel (1942), Popper (1957) and Simon (1959) also use this 
type of determinism in their respecüve analyses. 
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nal-detenninistic propositions of Latsis (1976) and combines them with Rizzo's, leading to four 
main postulates. However, he does not make clear all implications of these postulates. This 
section tries to specify most of them, which leads to the following articulation of the Neo-
Austrian hard core: 
(1) agents perceive a decision-making situation (Rizzo's first proposition); 
(2) agents act in a way appropriate to the logic of their situation. Specifically, they prefer the 
best altemative, given their knowledge and means (Latsis's propositions, which concern 
situational determinism and single-exit decision situations respectively); 
(3) since agents operate in a world of complexity and uncertainty, their decisions, although 
correct in a subjective sense, are not necessarily correct in some objective sense 
(Rizzo's second and third propositions); 
(4) nonetheless, there is a tendency toward coordination of activities (the spontaneous-order 
postulate). 
This formulation of the hard core of the Neo-Austrian research programme will be adopted as 
our basis for explicating some important propositions. 
Neo-Austrian economics studies human action in the social environment of the market. 
This means that the action axiom (and its logical derivations) is indispensable for Neo-Austrian 
economics. That is, it belongs to its hard core. Agents must then have a reason for action. They 
must perceive opportunities to do so. They must decide to act, and this decision implies choice. 
In turn, choice implies that several ends exist, out of which the agent must choose the one(s) he 
prefers. In order to do so he must order his preferences. Moreover, the agent must also choose 
the means to be employed in order to attain his ends: he must choose between different means 
and different ends. With the help of Langlois's articulation of the Neo-Austrian hard core, we 
can now draw up a more extended and explicit version, containing the following postulates: 
(1) Individual agents perceive a decision-making situation. 
(a) All social phenomena must be explained in terms of the individuals' actions 
{meihodological individualism). 
(b) The individuals perceive several altemative goals or future set of circumstances. 
(c) The agent can rank these goals according to their value, that is, he can determine 
subjectively which one he prefers. 
(d) The agents must act in order to remove feit uneasiness. 
(e) They have means at their disposal, which can be used to attain the goals. 
(f) These means are scarce and alternatively employable: individuals must choose 
between them. 
(g) This choice is based upon some knowledge concerning the effecüveness of the 
means. 
The term 'situation' is somewhat ambiguous. Given the Neo-Austrians' emphasis on 
subjectivism, the relevant decision situation is that as perceived by the economie agent. Thus, it 
is his perception of the environment in which he acts. 
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(h) This knowledge consists of expectations and interpretations concerning the 
structure of the environment, the actions of other agents, and the future 
values of exogenous variables. 
(i) The preferences, knowledge, interpretations and expectations are the data of the 
social sciences. They are subjective, in the sense that they can only be known 
by the agent holding them (radical subjectivism). 
(2) Agents act in a way appropriately to the logic of their situation. 
(a) The agents try to attain the goal which they prefer most. 
(b) They employ those means that they think are the most effective and efficiënt in 
reaching the goals. This choice of means is ex ante correct (i.e., before the 
action has taken place, given their information). 
(3) The agents' decisions need not be ex post correct. 
(a) Because knowledge is dispersed, agents have imperfect information. They do not 
know the structure of the 'correct' model, the actions (and underlying 
knowledge and expectations) of other agents, and the future value of 
exogenous variables. 
(b) Due to this imperfect information, individuals may make mistakes. 
(c) These mistakes may concern their ideas and expectations as regards (i) the other 
agents' preferences, (ii) the other agents' actions (and hence their knowledge 
and expectations), (iii) the causal relationsnip between preferred goals and 
employed means, and/or (iv) the future value of some exogenous variable(s). 
(d) Their decisions need not be correct ex post although they remain correct ex ante (cf. 
proposition 2b). The expected market outcome then may differ from the 
actual market outcome. 
These three central postulates are regarded as logical derivations from the axiom that human 
action is directed towards a goal and that it takes place in a complex and uncertain world. 
However, the social sciences are not concerned with individual human behaviour and action, but 
with the overall outcome of all individual actions. This means that the description of individual 
behaviour, that is, the pure logic of choice, must be combmed with the speciGcaüon of some 
interaction mechanism. This mechanism is the market process, the process of competition. Most 
Neo-Austrians postulate that this process will bring about a tendency towards some form of 
social order (coordination). This postulate is the fourth central one in their hard core: 
(4) The economy will tend towards a spontaneous order, because of the process of competition. 
(a) Even though individuals may make mistakes in their decisions, the market process 
will tend to eliminate those agents that are not successful. The agents' 
inclination to make use of profit opportunities will tend to eliminate them. In 
this sense the economy moves towards a coordination (general equilibrium). 
(b) This means that the agents' presupposed knowledge-acquiring and -processing 
abilities and their expectations-formation processes are such as to bring about 
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this tendency (although Neo-Austrians hardly ever explicate them). 
(c) The resulting sodal phenomena are not the result of human design, nor are they 
striven after by any individual agent. They are the unintended result of the 
actions of the agents, aimed at attaining their respective goals (spontaneous 
order or invisible-hand explanatiori). 
These four postulates (and their constituting propositions) form the hard core of the Neo-
Austrian economics. Neo-Austrians will not accept their falsification and/or refutation. Neverthe-
less, the postulates need not be corroborated by the facts, which means that they must be 
insulated from anomalies. The insulating, or protecting, propositions are contained in the 
protective belt. 
53. THE PROTECTIVE BELT 
The protective belt deals with inconsistendes between the implications of a theory and the 
observations.73 Rizzo (1982) argues that these inconsistendes can be traced back to either of two 
circumstances. He distinguishes between initial conditions and boundary circumstances. 
Misspedfication of these two types of conditions insulates the theory from empirical falsification 
and subsequent refutation. 
The first Neo-Austrian strategy to insulate the hard core from refutation concerns the 
initial conditions of the theory. These conditions contain the agents' goals, their knowledge, their 
expectations and the state of the exogenous variables. Most of these data of the sodal sdences 
are subjective. This means that they are very difficult to spedfy correctly. Given the dispersion 
of knowledge, a researcher cannot know all the goals, knowledge and beliefs of the agents. Some 
misspedfication will therefore be inevitable. This inevitable misspedfication in turn offers an 
explanation of why the theory is not corroborated by the facts. For example, a theory presuppo-
sing specific expectations may not become corroborated due to the fact that in reality individuals 
have different expectations than those presupposed by the theory. Changing the initial expectatio-
nal assumption will then eliminate the inconsistency. 
The problem of the initial conditions may also be analyzed in a different way. 
Consider the rationality postulate and let us distinguish between the axiom that agents' actions 
are goal-directed and the axiom that agents act because they want to attain a specific goal (e.g., 
profit maximization). The former can be interpreted as a way of looking at reality, as an inter-
pretation scheme. It is a priori true (whether analytic or synthetic), as are its logica! derivations. 
It should be noted that Rothbard's so-called auxiliary assumptions have nothing to do 
with the protective belt. These assumptions are merely necessary in order to derive hypotheses 
from the action axiom. They do not protect the action axiom from any inconsistendes between 
theory and observations, unless they are induded in either the initial or the boundary conditions. 
Cf. Hempel (1965 (1970)). 
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Logical consistency is then the only test of the theory. Inconsistendes can only be explained by 
arguing that the theory then was not intended to explain the phenomena under consideration. 
For instance, one need not be surpnsed if one cannot explain a volcanic eruption in tenns of 
human action. In contrast, the axiom concerning the specific content of the agents' goals is an 
empirical proposition. It is not a priori true and hence subject to falsification. Inconsistendes 
between theoretical implications and observations may be due to the misspedfication of the 
contents of the goals. Varying this content may then lead to a complete and correct explanation, 
as it did in the case of misspedfied expectations. For instance, suppose we assume initially that 
individuals maximize monetary profit. This implies that they will seize every (known) opportunity 
to make such profits. An anomaly will emerge if this is not the case in reality. Changing the 
initial assumption into the maximization of psychic profits may then lead to an explanation of 
the existence of monetary profit opportunities by arguing that they were not worthwhile. In this 
sense inconsistendes will lead to an elimination of misspedfied initial conditions. 
The second strategy used by Neo-Austrians to protect their hard core is their use of 
the ceteris paribus dause. In order to predict one must know not only the initial conditions, but 
also the conditions which prevail between the time when the prediction is made and the time 
when the predicted event should occur. These boundary conditions concern all variables which 
are exogenous to the prediction under consideration. When they remain unchanged, some 
appropriately specified ceteris paribus dause applies, which holds that all other things (i.e., the 
boundary conditions) have remained equal, and hence do not exert any disturbing influence on 
the predicted variable. As Rizzo (1982, p. 61) states, "[i]f conditions do not remain unchanged, 
then, of course, the predictions of the hypothesis may be inconsistent with observed outcomes. 
Any such inconsistency can potentially be attributed to the inapplicability of some aspect of the 
ceteris paribus dause." In this way any inconsistency between the condusions of the theory and 
the results of empirical tests can be explained away. However, resorting to this strategy makes it 
senseless to confront the theory and its condusions with 'reality1, because it immunizes the 
condusions from falsification. It seems that only dogmatic Neo-Austrians such as Mises, 
Rothbard and Hoppe would go this far. Revisionist Neo-Austrians such as Hayek, Lachmann, 
O'Driscoü, Rizzo and Langlois seem to be willing to face such a confrontation. This can be 
done by specifying as explidtly as possible the ceteris paribus dause. 
To condude, the Neo-Austrians vary both the initial conditions (induding the agents' 
goals and knowledge) and the boundary conditions (as specified implidtly or explidtly in the 
ceteris paribus dause) in order to immwnize their hard core from falsification. 
Having defined the hard core and the protective belt we may now identify the research 
strategy prescribed by the Neo-Austrians. This strategy is called the heuristic. It consists of two 
parts, namely that which tells them how to formulate their theories (the positive heuristic) and 
the part which tells them how not to formulate them (negative heuristic). 
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5.4. THE POSITIVE HEURISTIC 
The positive heuristic is govemed by the postulates in the hard core. They determine the 
principles according to which Neo-Austrians should form their theories. As was shown in section 
3, these principles are (1) methodological individualism, (2) methodological singularism, (3) 
radical subjectivism, and (4) methodological dualism. We may add the obvious fact that the 
positive heuristic must incorporate the fundamental problems to be addressed; that is, the goals 
of Neo-Austrian economics as a social science. After all, if it describes the research strategy to 
be foliowed, it must also contain the direction in which the research must go. And this direction 
is of course determined by the Neo-Austrian goals of science. 
The positive heuristic may be articulated as follows: 
(1) Explain the creation and existence of social phenomena as unintended in nature (i.e., as the 
result of human action but not of human design). This means that these phenomena 
must be interpreted and explained as the (unintended) result of the coordination of 
activities. 
(2) If actions seem to be discoordinating, search for reasons why this is the case, i.e., search for 
reasons why the spontaneous order has not emerged. More in particular, when dealing 
with market phenomena, why do prices fail to bring about intertemporal general 
equilibrium by conveying correct information? 
(3) Explain the phenomena in terms of purposeful, individual action which is directed towards 
the attainment of the individuals' goals (methodological individualism). 
(4) Treat the factors on which individuals base their decisions and actions (that is, their ends, 
means, knowledge and expectations) as subjective, in the sense that they can only be 
known completely by the individuals holding them. This means that they are unknowa-
ble for the social scientist (radical subjectivism, dispersion of information). 
(5) Treat actions as singular events. They take place in time and they cannot be repeated under 
identical circumstances. This means that attention must be directed towards the 
explanation of processes, instead of situations (methodological singularism). The 
process of competition is considered to be the most important process in market 
economies. 
(6) Use the method of Versteken. The social scientist must try to establish by introspection the 
goals which the market participants try to attain. 
These six directives constitute the positive heuristic. They clarify how Neo-Austrian economists 
should proceed. They define the problems to be analyzed (rules 1 and 2), and the ways in which 
this should be done (rules 3, 4, 5 and 6). However, they do not prescribe what research 
strategies Neo-Austrian economists must not follow. Such rules are given in the negative 
heuristic. 
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5.5. THE NEGATIVE HEURISTIC 
Analogously to the positive heuristic, the negative heuristic consists of a set of specific directives 
as regards the ways in which science should not proceed. Obviously, these directives are the 
negations of those constituting the positive heuristic. After all, if Neo-Austrians prescribe 
methodological individualism, they do not allow for explanations in terras of a common will 
(Gemeinwillen). In other words, if the specific directives of the positive heuristic hold that Neo-
Austrians should do p, then the negative heuristic must incorporate a directive that they should 
not do -p (not p). 
The Neo-Austrian negative heuristic is quite extensive. In particular, it has been 
elaborated by Mises (1949 (1966)) and Hayek (1952b (1979)). Most of their arguments have 
already been discussed in section 3. Therefore, the present section will merely concentrate on 
those directives which have not yet been discussed sufficiently. In particular, this concerns the 
use of of mathematics, statistics, and index numbers. 
Analogously to the positive heuristic, the negative heuristic can be formulated as follows: 
(1) Do not explain social phenomena as the results of human design, that is, as the intended 
consequences of any human or superhuman mind. 
(2) Do not use collective entitites which cannot be traced back to purposeful individual actions. 
Such entities include hypostatizations such as the representative individual, in the sense 
of a mathematical average. 
(3) Do not 'objectify' the data of economics as a social science. To put it in terras of mathema-
tical models: the scientist cannot presume that the agents' have perfect information and 
perfect foresight as regards (i) the structure of the correct model, (ii) the values of the 
relevant parameters, (iii) the past, current and future values of the endogenous 
variables, and (iv) the past, current and future values of the exogenous variables. 
(4) Do not use probability functions, because these imply that actions are repeatable. This 
means that the economy cannot be described in terms of stochastic processes. 
(5) Do not adhere to methodological monism. Economics as a social science deals with human 
actions while the natura! sciences do not. This means that the social scientists should 
not use the methods of the natural sciences. There is therefore no reason why the 
method of Versteken should not be adopted. 
This presentation of the directives of the negative heuristic uses mathematical, econometrical or 
statistical terminology. Neo-Austrians do not use such terminology, because they reject the use 
of statistics. Some Neo-Austrians, like Mises, also reject the use of mathematical models, while 
others (e.g. Hayek) seem to allow such a use. The following contains a discussion of the Neo-
Austrian position as regards (i) index numbers, (ii) statistics, and (iii) mathematical models. 
Firstly, Neo-Austrians hold that index numbers fail to do justice to the complexity of 
economie life. This has some important consequences for the problems to be analyzed. This can 
be clarified by considering the genera! price index. Like all index numbers, this index is a 
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weighted average of the prices of a 'basket' of commodities. However, lumping these commodi-
ties together into an index number disregards the differences in quality and the changes in the 
agents' valuations, or at least cannot make these differences and changes explicit. According to 
Mises (1949 (1966), p. 221), in economie reality "[[v]aluations change too, and they cause 
changes in demand and production. The assumptions of the measurement doctrine [on which the 
construction of index numbers is based] would require men whose wants and valuations are 
rigid. Only if people were to value the same things always in the same way, could we consider 
price changes as expressive changes in the power of money to buy things." The genera! price 
index thus does not explicate relative prices. Such prices express the individuals' valuations, 
thereby providing signals to entrepreneurs. The entrepreneurs can then base their decisions upon 
these signals. According to Neo-Austrians, this leads to a tendency towards coordination, that is, 
a tendency towards a situation in which all relevant information is efficiently used. Neo-
Austrians argue that there can be no economie calculation without such a system of relative 
prices, because entrepreneurs would then not be able to discover pro&t opportunities. A 
coordinating tendency then cannot exist. This means that the use of index numbers, especially 
the general price index, elhninates those variables which are the most important for the 
economie process and the dissemination of knowledge during that process. It disregards the 
importance of the coordination problem, which lies at the heart of Neo-Austrian analysis. 
Secondly, Neo-Austrians argue that index numbers should not be used in economics 
because of its implications for the role of the social scientist. Index numbers are calculated by 
statisticians, who attach coefficients to the various commodities. These coeffidents must express 
the different roles played by the commodities in the individuals' households. However, these 
roles are difficult to assess and are liable to change, because information is dispersed and hence 
incomplete. Those social scientists who calculate and use index numbers thus implicitly neglect 
the dispersion of knowledge. This means, as Hayek (1952b (1979) pp. 90 - 91) claims, that they 
implicitly adopt the view that"... the student of society ... [is] endowed with a kind of supermind, 
with some sort of absolute knowledge, which makes it unnecessary for him to start from what is 
known by the people whose actions he studies." In other words, the use of index numbers is 
merely another form of scientism. 
It follows from what has been said on index numbers that statistics can only provide 
rough and inaccurate accounts of changes in a market economy. lts use can only be justified if 
agents would take its results into account while making their decisions. According to Mises (1949 
Hayek (1952b (1979)) argues that the use of index numbers is inherent in the objectivism 
of scientism. Scientism is the "... slavish imitation of the method and language of Science ..." 
(Hayek (1952b (1979) p. 24). Its objectivism searches "... for the 'real' attributes of the objects of 
human activity which lie behind men's views about them" (p. 88). In Hayek's view, it leads to a 
tendency to concentrate research efforts on phenomena which can be 'measured', although many 
of such 'measurements' are absolutely meamngless. Such a tendency is in conflict with the Neo-
Austrian radical subjectivism, which implies that the data of the social sciences consist of the 
views which individuals hold as regards their economie situation. 
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(1966), p. 223), this is not the case. He claims that "[i]n practical life nobody Iets himself be 
fooled by index numbers [and statistics] ... [because] nobody acquiesces in an index number if he 
does not expert a personal advantage from its acknowledgment by public opinion." In nis view, 
individuals do not base their decisions on considerations which involve the general price index or 
other statistically derived entities. Statistics cannot contribute valuable theoretical insights. 
In addition to their rejection of statistics, Neo-Austrians do not use mathematics. In 
their view, market economies cannot be represented completely in a mathematical model There 
are simply too many equations and endogenous variables which must be solved. This means that 
there are in principle two options: (1) restraining from the use of mathematical models, or (2) 
adopting simplifying assumptions. The latter implies that the social scientist must abstract from 
those feature of the economie process which are regarded as less essential. He may thus limit 
(i) the number of goods in the economy under considerations, (ii) the number of agents 
operating in that economy, (iii) the (number of) interrelations between those agents, and (iv) the 
number of exogenous variables (by specifying a (more or less appropriate) ceteris paribus 
clause). Such simplifications must be rather rigorous because of the complexity of social 
phenomena. This means that mathematical models will not contribute to the analysis of the 
coordination problem. They will merely simplify the analysis, or even assume the problem away. 
Given the importance Neo-Austrians attach to the analysis of the coordination problem, they do 
not allow such a circumvention. Therefore, they object to the use of mathematical models. Mises 
(1949 (1966), p. 354) concludes that "[t]he equations formulated by mathematical economies 
remain a useless piece of mental gymnastics and would remain so even if they were to express 
much more than they really do." However, some Neo-Austrians implicitly allow for the use of 
mathematics. As may already have become clear from what has been said on pattern prediction, 
Hayek (1937) considers the use of mathematical models quite useful, albeit only as a preliminary 
study. It cannot be used for explaining real-world economie phenomena. In addition, Hayek 
(1939 and 1969), Rothbard (1962) and Garrison (1978) use diagrams. And as diagrams are 
merely graphical representations of mathematical formulas, they presuppose mathematics. 
Obviously, these Neo-Austrians then cannot reject the use of mathematics in economies. 
6. CONCLUSIONS AND STNAL REMARKS 
Neo-Austrians emphasize the purposefulness of human action. Human action is considered 
rational, in the sense that it aims at attaining subjective goals. Praxeology deduces propositions 
from this action axiom. However, Neo-Austrians differ on the truth status of these propositions 
and, therefore, the axiom. Whereas some claim that it constitutes a Kantian synthetic a priori 
proposition, others argue that the axiom is 'merely* an analytical a priori proposition. A third 
group claims that the axiom is a self-evident, a posteriori proposition. Obviously, these 
differences have their effects on the positions with regard to empirical testing. Two groups may 
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be discerned, one maintaining that testing is meaningless, the other asserting that testing is 
necessary although in practice rather diffcult. These respective currents may be labelled 
'dogmatic' and 'revisionistic'. 
Neo-Austrian economics is clearly methodological-individualistic. It seeks to explain 
'reality' in terras of the individual striving to fulfil plans. These plans are interpreted as 
subjective in the sense that they are only known to the subjects under study. More in particular, 
Neo-Austrians must be called dynamic-subjectivists, because they view the human mind as 
essentially creative. Human beings not only behave according to the logjc of their situations, they 
also create part of that situation. The process of competition, being a process of discovery of 
ends and means, is crucial in this regard. A third major characteristic of 'Austrianism' is that it 
views each action as a unique event. This means that they do not allow for the incorporation of 
stochastic elements. Neo-Austrians are methodological singularists. The fourth methodological 
tenet of Neo-Austrian anah/sis is its methodological dualism. Neo-Austrians distinguish two 
grounds on which they conclude that the social sciences must not use the same methods of 
research as the natural sciences. Firstly, the social sciences study human behaviour. The social 
scientist, as a human being, can understand his fellow-man. He can use the method of 
'Verstehen'. The natural scientist, on the other hand, cannot use this method. The second 
ground on which Neo-Austrians decide to adhere to methodological dualism refers to the 
complexity of the phenomena studied. While the natural scientist can experiment in laboratory 
circumstances, the social scientist cannot perform such experiments because social phenomena 
are much more complex than the natural phenomena. This makes empirical testing almost 
impossible, because the researcher cannot specify all initial conditions. Additionally, the boundary 
conditions are liable to change. This necessitates the adoption of other methods than those of 
the natural sciences. 
Neo-Austrians, as Lachmann has pointed out, try to achieve two goals: (1) to make the 
world intelligible in terms of human actions (individual plans); and (2) to explain the unintended 
consequences of the actions based on individual plans. They try to reach these goals by adopting 
two basic tenets, namely (1) human beings act rationally, and (2) human knowledge is unpredic-
table. Whereas the first goal and first tenet are consistent with each other, the second goal and 
tenet seem to be inconsistent. If human knowledge cannot be known, then their goals (or 
intentions) cannot be known. And this means that we cannot determine whether the results of 
the individual actions are intended or unintended. However, Neo-Austrians may 'retrodict' 
constellations of plans, which suffice to explain the social phenomena under consideration. These 
retrodictions are contingent, hence empirically testable. Testability may thus be saved in Neo-
Austrian methodology by limiting it to retrodiction. Hence the Neo-Austrian attempts of making 
social phenomena intelligible in terms of rational human action can be tested by means of 
'postdiction' ('retrodiction'). By contrast, prediction then constitutes a senseless activity. 
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